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Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic 
L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff 
ABSTRACT: The doctrine of self-defense evaluates the reasonableness of 
criminality judgments. Yet, it fails to account for how non-conscious 
cognitions place those who are stereotyped as criminal at greater risk of 
mistaken judgments of criminality—sometimes with deadly consequences. 
Studies reveal, for example, that people are more likely to see weapons in the 
hands of unarmed black men than unarmed white men, and to more 
quickly shoot them as a result. Because self-defense doctrine does not attend 
to these judgment errors, it fails to interrogate how, if at all, these mistakes 
should affect assessments of reasonableness. Drawing from powerful and 
well-established mind sciences research, this Essay introduces a concept that 
we term the “suspicion heuristic.” This concept explains how non-conscious 
processes can lead to systematic and predictable errors in judgments of 
criminality—and influence subsequent behaviors—regardless of conscious 
racial attitudes. This Essay argues that in order to provide more equal 
protection, security, and liberty to all victims of violence, the law of self-
defense should account for the suspicion heuristic in its assessments of 
reasonableness. This Essay traces the broad outlines of a theoretical and 
legal framework for doing so. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Trayvon Martin killing has caused our nation, again, to confront 
both our vicious legacy of racial violence and the long road towards racial 
equity that we still have to travel. Regardless of what specific facts emerge in 
the case, the killing of this black teen sparked outrage and resentment along 
familiar racial lines. Not surprisingly, it also devolved quickly into discussions 
about George Zimmerman—Martin’s killer—and the content of his 
character. Is he a bigot?1 If so, was that bigotry responsible for Martin’s 
death? While it is tempting to fixate on this possibility, there is significant 
scientific evidence that a host of subtler mental processes can conspire to 
produce racially discriminatory behaviors—even absent conscious racial bias. 
These psychological processes are both predictable and pervasive, warping 
the perceptions of even the most egalitarian of individuals. 
This Essay argues that scholars, lawyers, and policymakers should attend 
to the ways that normal psychological processes can bias judgments of 
criminality in a manner inconsistent with the values of liberty, safety, and 
security. Doing so is important because, sadly, killings of innocent non-white 
individuals are not aberrational.2 What is required is a new legal and 
theoretical framework that can account for these biases—one that does not 
rely upon the fiction of the objective decision-maker or the scapegoat of the 
consciously biased actor. This Essay is the first in a series of articles that 
develops this framework. 
In this Essay, we draw from mind sciences research to introduce a 
concept that we term the “suspicion heuristic.” We use this concept to 
explain how normal psychological processes that operate below the level of 
conscious awareness can lead to systematic errors in judgments of 
criminality. This concept provides an important new lens for scrutinizing 
legal doctrines that rely upon the reasonableness of criminality judgments—
primarily self-defense and stop-and-frisks. Both doctrines use reasonableness 
in an attempt to delicately balance security and liberty. In the self-defense 
context, individuals are entitled to defend themselves, but only if their 
actions are necessary and proportionate from the perspective of the 
reasonable person. In the proactive-policing setting, law enforcement 
 
 1. See Ashley Hayes, Witnesses Tell FBI that George Zimmerman Is No Racist, CNN.COM (July 
13, 2012, 7:44 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/12/justice/florida-teen-shooting/index. 
html. 
 2. See infra notes 122–52 and accompanying text (discussing the shooting deaths of 
Yoshihiro Hattori and Trayvon Martin). See generally CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE 
REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (2003) (discussing cases). 
Many of the reported cases involve police shootings of innocent non-Whites. For instance, on 
February 4, 1999, four white NYPD officers shot Amadou Diallo, an unarmed West African 
immigrant, forty-one times while he was standing in his doorway. Jane Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict: 
The Overview; 4 Officers in Diallo Shooting Are Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2000), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/26/nyregion/diallo-verdict-overview-4-officers-diallo-
shooting-are-acquitted-all-charges.html. Nineteen bullets hit Diallo, killing him. Id. 
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officers are entitled to briefly detain, question, and cursorily search 
individuals, but only if an individual’s actions give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion of criminality. Yet, neither doctrine attends to the systematic errors 
caused by racial stereotypes that can affect judgments of criminality nor 
determines how these mistakes should affect assessments of reasonableness. 
As a result, these doctrines often fail to protect those individuals who have 
the misfortune to be stereotyped3 as criminal—sometimes with deadly 
consequences. 
This Essay scrutinizes the doctrine of self-defense4 and proceeds in 
three parts. Part I introduces the “suspicion heuristic” and discusses the 
scientific research that supports it. Part II contemplates the implications of 
the suspicion heuristic for the law of self-defense. Finally, Part III considers 
the duty to retreat and argues that, in light of the suspicion heuristic, it 
should be a non-discretionary component of self-defense doctrine. 
I. THE SUSPICION HEURISTIC 
This Part introduces the “suspicion heuristic,” a concept we develop to 
explain the predictable errors in perception, decision-making, and action 
that can occur when individuals make judgments of criminality. The 
suspicion heuristic links lessons from two distinct, but related, bodies of 
research in the mind sciences—the study of heuristics and biases on the one 
hand and the study of implicit (non-conscious) racial bias on the other. We 
make this connection to explain how merely perceiving race—even absent 
racial animus—can bias judgments of criminality. While both areas of 
research concern themselves with how people think and process 
information, they are rarely coupled in legal literature.5 
Over four decades of research in both fields reveals that many of our 
conscious thoughts, behaviors, and judgments are affected by mental 
 
 3. In this Essay, we define stereotypes as “the general inclination to place a person in 
categories according to some easily and quickly identifiable characteristic such as age, sex, 
ethnic membership, nationality or occupation, and then to attribute to him qualities believed to 
be typical of members of that category.” Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and 
Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 591 (1976) (quoting Renato Taguiri, Person Perception, in 3 THE 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 395, 423 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 2d ed. 
1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: 
Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 369 n.2 (1996) (defining 
stereotypes as “well-internalized associations regarding groups of people that result in habitually 
automatic, gut-level responses” (emphasis omitted)). 
 4. An analysis of the suspicion heuristic and its relevance to the proactive policing 
context will be forthcoming in an article tentatively titled “Suspicion Cascades.” 
 5. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 973 
(2006) (noting that implicit racial bias “has not generally been grouped with the ‘heuristics and 
biases’ uncovered by research in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics”). The first 
article to link these distinct bodies of research in the legal literature was written by Christine 
Jolls and Cass Sunstein. Id.  
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processes beyond our ability to control volitionally. The term “suspicion 
heuristic” is a gesture towards the work of Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, 
and others on heuristics and biases. This literature, recently summarized by 
the Nobel Prize-winning Kahneman in his book, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 
refers to the human tendency to use decision-making shortcuts (heuristics).6 
While these mental shortcuts allow us to understand our social worlds 
quickly and accurately most of the time, they can also lead to systematic 
errors in judgment.7 Because of the popularity of Kahneman’s recent work, 
it seems appropriate to use the term “suspicion heuristic” to translate the 
science of thinking about decisions in general to the process of assessing 
suspicion. The “suspicion heuristic” can be understood as a mental shortcut 
that often leads to systematic errors in determining who is and is not 
suspicious. 
The heuristic shortcuts that have been the subject of study in the field 
of cognitive psychology are themselves vulnerable to other non-conscious 
(i.e., implicit) human biases.8 In the field of social psychology, researchers 
have found that implicit biases tend to disadvantage stigmatized social 
groups such as Blacks,9 women,10 and the poor.11 Consequently, in order to 
engage the full consequences of a “suspicion heuristic,” we review the 
relevant literature on heuristics in Subpart A and the relevant literature on 
implicit racial biases in Subpart B.12 Finally, in Subpart C, we intertwine the 
lessons from these two bodies of research to develop the “suspicion 
heuristic.” 
 
 6. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
 7. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124–31 (1974). 
 8. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 877, 889–91 (2004). 
 9. Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the 
Decision To Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1015–22 (2007); Eberhardt, supra 
note 8, at 876, 888–91; Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical 
Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 302–05 
(2008). 
 10. Brenda Major & Laurie T. O’Brien, The Social Psychology of Stigma, 56 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 393, 396, 400, 407–08 (2005). 
 11. Heather E. Bullock, Class Acts: Middle-Class Responses to the Poor, in THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL DISCRIMINATION 118, 118–59 (Bernice Lott & Diane Maluso 
eds., 1995). 
 12. We conclude these Subparts with a discussion of how non-conscious and/or automatic 
decisions and associations can provoke troubling behaviors. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 
Choices, Values, and Frames, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 1–16 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky eds., 2000); Correll et al., supra note 9, at 1006–23 (discussing how mental processes 
can lead to consequential behaviors); Eberhardt et al., supra note 8, at 876–93 (same); Goff et 
al., supra note 9, at 292–306 (same); Allen R. McConnell & Jill M. Leibold, Relations Among the 
Implicit Association Test, Discriminatory Behavior, and Explicit Measures of Racial Attitudes, 37 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 435 (2001) (same); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, at 1124–
31 (same). 
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A. HEURISTICS AND BIASES 
Heuristics are mental shortcuts or rules of thumb whereby people 
reduce complex decisions to simpler assessments.13 People often utilize 
heuristics to make decisions and predictions without any conscious 
awareness that they are doing so.14 While heuristics are efficient given the 
limitations of the human mind to process information, they can also 
produce systematic errors of judgment that predictably recur in certain 
situations, known as biases.15 
Many of the heuristics studied by psychologists are connected to “dual 
process” theories in cognitive psychology.16 According to these theories, 
people use two mental processes to make judgments and process 
information. System 1 refers to the fast, intuitive, and typically non-
conscious mental processes that influence most conscious thought and 
action—we might think of these as our “gut” feelings or intuitions. System 2 
refers to processes that are slower, conscious, and deliberate. As Kahneman 
writes, “The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective 
experience of agency, choice, and concentration. . . . When we think of 
ourselves, we identify with System 2, the conscious, reasoning self that has 
beliefs, makes choices, and decides what to think about and what to do.”17 
While most of us believe that we have conscious access to, and control over, 
our thoughts, feelings, and judgments,18 in truth, the automatic and 
 
 13. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, at 1124; see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 98 
(explaining that a heuristic is a “simple procedure that helps [people] find adequate, though 
often imperfect, answers to difficult questions”). Heuristics have received significant attention 
in the field of cognitive psychology. For a general discussion of heuristics, see Daniel Kahneman 
& Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 49–50 (Thomas Gilovich 
et al. eds., 2002). For a summary of the over four decades of research in heuristic reasoning, see 
KAHNEMAN, supra note 6. 
 14. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 97. 
 15. Id. at 3–4, 130; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, at 1124, 1131. 
 16. See generally Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 13, at 51; DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999). 
 17. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 21. System 1 and System 2 are not actual systems that exist 
within our brains. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 13, at 51. Rather, psychologists employ 
these terms as “label[s] for collections of processes that are distinguished by their speed, 
controllability, and the contents on which they operate.” Id. Intriguingly, however, there is 
some neuroscience evidence that System 1 and System 2 thinking utilize different areas of the 
brain. Jonathan St. B.T. Evans, In Two Minds: Dual-Process Accounts of Reasoning, 7 TRENDS 
COGNITIVE SCI. 454, 456 (2003). 
 18. LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 187–96 (1991); Emily Pronin & Lee Ross, Temporal Differences in Trait Self-
Ascription: When the Self Is Seen as an Other, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 197, 197 (2006); 
Emily Pronin, Daniel Y. Lin & Lee Ross, The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 
28 PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 369 (2002); Robert J. Robinson et al., Actual Versus 
Assumed Differences in Construal: “Naive Realism” in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 404, 414–15 (1995).  
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unconscious processes of System 1 are often the primary source of our 
conscious impressions, beliefs, feelings, intuitions, and choices.19 System 1 
processes operate almost instantaneously, guiding and influencing our 
judgments and behaviors much more than we are consciously aware.20 
Many of the characteristics of System 1 are crucial to our survival. As 
psychologists note, our ability to function in the world would be greatly 
reduced without mental shortcuts that process information quickly and 
without conscious effort.21 In plain language, if an individual had to exert 
effort to remember the way to work every day, there would be no mental 
energy left to do any work by the time the individual arrived. Furthermore, 
System 1 features facilitate our ability to act quickly—without the need for 
conscious thought—when confronted with an unexpected emergency. For 
instance, if an armed individual were rapidly approaching, it would be 
essential to determine whether the individual poses a threat. System 1 can 
provide a “gut” response to the “friend or foe” question. 
Luckily for most of us, System 1 often gets things right. Our intuitions, 
instincts, and gut reactions are frequently accurate, and using non-conscious 
processes to achieve that accuracy saves us valuable cognitive resources.22 As 
a result, our minds are freed from the tedium of smaller considerations 
(e.g., what route must I take to get home again?) to ponder more important 
considerations (e.g., what do I want for dinner?). 
The biggest problem with System 1 thinking is that, despite being able 
to reach decisions quickly and conserve cognitive resources,23 it is prone to 
systematic errors (i.e., biases). As an example, think of the first word that 
comes to mind in response to the following questions: 
What type of music did Peter, Paul & Mary play? 
Folk. 
What does a comedian tell that makes people laugh? 
A joke. 
What is a wire in the middle of a bicycle? 
A spoke. 
What billows out of the top of a campfire? 
Smoke. 
What sound does a frog make? 
 
 19. ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 18. 
 20. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 13, 20, 29; Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their 
Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 15 (1989); Anthony 
G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee & Jordan L.K. Schwartz, Measuring Individual Differences in 
Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464, 
1477 (1998). 
 21. See David H. Ebenbach & Dacher Keltner, Power, Emotion, and Judgmental Accuracy in 
Social Conflict: Motivating the Cognitive Miser, 20 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 7, 7 (1998). 
 22. Tversky & Kahnemen, supra note 7, at 1124. 
 23. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 51, 70. 
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Croak. 
What is the white part of an egg? 
Well . . . it is the white part of an egg. An egg white.24 If, in your mind, 
you said “yolk,” however, you are not alone. System 1 processed a set of 
answers that fit a pattern—words that rhyme with “folk”—and provided an 
answer that was associated with “part of an egg” that fit that pattern: “yolk.” 
So, while System 1 likely helped you to figure out what sound a frog makes 
without thinking too hard, it hindered your attempt to identify the white 
part of an egg (even if you got the answer right). The reason is that System 1 
uses so-called associative activation networks to do a lot of the work for it.25 
Hence, associative activation networks are one explanation for why System 1 
is prone to systematic errors.  
A second source of error is that many of the mental processes System 1 
performs are beyond our ability to volitionally control.26 For instance, 
people cannot stop themselves from comprehending sentences in their own 
language assuming, of course, that the sentences are not gobbledygook.27 
Thus, while System 1 is efficient, skilled, and often accurate, the inability to 
suppress its operations can lead to systematic and predictable errors of 
judgment. 
The final source of System 1 errors stems from the fact that we will 
often adopt the intuitions of System 1 unquestioningly, unless something 
activates System 2. One situation in which the deliberate and slow-thinking 
System 2 will override System 1 is if we encounter an individual (or an 
object) that is surprising or does not conform to our expectations. System 2 
will be mobilized in an attempt to resolve the disparity.28 For instance, 
System 2 would take over if you saw a pregnant man29 or a barking cat.30 
Attempting to reconcile the event with your understanding of the world by 
becoming consciously engaged and analytical is a System 2 mental process.31 
However, this process will never be engaged when you are not consciously 
aware of any uncertainty. 
 
 24. Of course, the egg white is also known as the albumen. 
 25. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 51. “Associative activation networks” are also referred to as 
spreading activation, associative networks, and other names. See, e.g., John R. Anderson, A 
Spreading Activation Theory of Memory, 22 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 261 (1983); 
Allan M. Collins & Elizabeth F. Loftus, A Spreading-Activation Theory of Semantic Processing, 82 
PSYCHOL. REV. 407 (1975); Elliot R. Smith, Mental Representation and Memory, in THE HANDBOOK 
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 391, 391–445 (Daniel Gilbert, Susan Fiske & Lindsay Gardner eds., 4th 
ed. 1998). 
 26. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 25. 
 27. Id. at 22. 
 28. Id. at 24, 25. 
 29. Id. at 74. 
 30. Id. at 24. 
 31. Id. at 60, 80; see also Evans, supra note 17, at 454. 
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Errors in System 1 reasoning are difficult to eliminate or even 
recognize. We take them as natural, and often treat them as correct unless 
they are scrutinized later. Many would say that this is the benefit of System 
2—the self-reflective and deliberative process the mind uses for more 
difficult, less-rehearsed problems. When an unexpected piece of 
information causes a disruption in System 1 thinking (e.g., the word “yolk” 
does not sound right after you say it), System 2 processes take control to 
deduce the correct answer.32 “System 1 provides snap judgments and offers a 
form of rough-and-ready, bias-prone thinking that leans heavily on factual 
context and previously held beliefs. System 2 kicks in after a time delay and 
corrects errors . . . .”33 
Understood in this way, System 1 and System 2 processes provide a 
nearly ideal model of mental functioning. All things being equal, we rely on 
our intuitions, which saves us valuable cognitive resources. However, when 
confronted with a novel or surprising situation, we have the capacity to 
engage in more effortful processing. Unfortunately, there are often 
occasions when we rely on System 1 when System 2 would produce more 
accurate assessments, and vice versa. In other words, no matter how often 
our minds get it right, there are times when we should not trust ourselves to 
produce objective and accurate assessments of the world around us. 
Of particular concern in this Essay are the errors we tend to make in the 
realm of race and suspicion. In the social-cognitive tradition of Kahneman 
and Tversky,34 psychologists have exploited System 1’s use of automatic 
associative activation networks to explore the ways in which our minds 
perceive race. These networks provide a pathway towards a particular kind of 
System 1 error: implicit racial bias. For the most part, the research studying 
these implicit racial biases has developed separately from the research we 
just discussed on heuristics and biases in general. We discuss the research on 
implicit racial biases next. 
B. IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS 
We can think of implicit biases as System 1 mental shortcuts that help us 
make meaning of persons and/or social groups.35 Put another way, implicit 
biases are the automatic associations connected with a social group. For 
instance, one might associate “elderly” with “wise,” “women” with 
“nurturing,” and “lawyers” with “expensive.” Possessing automatic 
associations is not, in and of itself, problematic. However, a significant body 
 
 32. Importantly, System 2 does not always get it right, either. Kahneman & Frederick, 
supra note 13, at 52. 
 33. Kevin Emerson Collins, Constructive Nonvolition in Patent Law and the Problem of 
Insufficient Thought Control, 2007 WISC. L. REV. 759, 796 n.124 (2007). 
 34. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 12; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7. 
 35. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005) (describing a 
similar framework that he terms “racial mechanics”). 
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of literature now demonstrates that these automatic associations can 
influence perceptions and subsequent behaviors.36 Consequently, the 
automatic association of “Blacks” with “criminal,” for instance, may cause 
someone to interpret ambiguous behavior by a black target as more criminal 
than identical behavior by a white target. Much like “folk” calls to mind 
things that rhyme with it, and can lead a reader to substitute “yolk” for “egg 
whites,” “Black” calls to mind stereotypes associated with it, and can lead an 
observer to perceive behaviors in line with those stereotypes. 
Importantly, these racially biased judgments do not require traditional 
bigotry. Rather, for individuals who associate “Black” with “criminal” 
unconsciously in their minds, it is possible that the mere mention of the 
category “Black” can activate the trait “criminal,” causing them to interpret 
behaviors in line with the activated concept—even if they are committed 
anti-racists and even if they are Black themselves. This is, again, because of 
associative activation networks.37 
In the field of psychology, ideas can be thought of as “nodes in a vast 
network, called associative memory, in which each idea is linked to many 
others.”38 Associative activation is not a linear process, with each idea only 
being linked to one other idea. Rather, one idea activates many different 
ideas all at once, and these activated ideas, then, activate others.39 The 
majority of this activity occurs outside of conscious awareness.40 
What causes the mind to link ideas of circumstances, events, and 
actions, among others, is that these ideas regularly occur at the same time or 
within a relatively short interval.41 Because of this co-occurrence, the mind 
learns to associate these ideas.42 Once these links or associations are made, 
they are kept in memory and accessed unintentionally and without effort the 
next time any of these ideas are activated.43 
Once associations are linked and strengthened through practice, this 
pattern of associated ideas constructs a mental model for what is normal or 
typical.44 Objects are associated with their properties, and people are 
associated with their groups.45 Once these models are built, people’s 
 
 36. See, e.g., L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
2035, 2043–56 (2011) (citing sources). 
 37. Devine, supra note 20, at 6–7, 15–16. 
 38. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 52. 
 39. Id. at 51–52. 
 40. Id. at 52; John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity of Being, 54 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 462 (1999); Devine, supra note 20, at 6. 
 41. Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 40, at 468. 
 42. Id. at 468–70. 
 43. Id. 
 44. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 72, 74, 168; Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 40, at 467–68; 
Devine, supra note 20, at 5–6. 
 45. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 52; Marilynn B. Brewer, A Dual Process Model of Impression 
Formation, in ADVANCES IN SOCIAL COGNITION 1 (Thomas K. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr. eds., 
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memories hold an image of prototypical members of these categories.46 And 
when the “groups” are people, and the “categories” are races, our minds 
tend to use stereotypes as a kind of mental shorthand for group categories—
saving us time, but often applying traits to individuals that are neither 
accurate nor fair.47 
Jennifer Eberhardt and one of the authors of this Essay recently 
published work designed to investigate this automatic association between 
racial groups and the stereotypes attached to them.48 Specifically, in a series 
of studies, these psychologists investigated whether the automatic association 
of Blacks with crime also influenced what individuals saw and how they 
directed their attention.49 In one study, participants were brought into the 
lab and subliminally primed (i.e., shown pictures so quickly on a computer 
screen that participants were unaware they had seen anything) with pictures 
of black or white male faces.50 Participants then watched a series of movies 
that displayed images progressing from “snow” on an old television to a clear 
picture of an object.51 Participants were instructed to press a button when 
they were able to identify the object.52 They saw two kinds of objects: crime-
related objects (e.g., guns, badges, fingerprints, etc.) and crime-unrelated 
objects (e.g., staplers, tea cups, keys, etc.).53 
Reaction-time analyses demonstrated that when participants had been 
exposed to white male faces, they found both crime-related and crime-
unrelated objects equally fast.54 However, when participants had been 
exposed to black male faces, they saw crime-related objects faster than crime-
unrelated objects.55 In this case, the mere presence of Blackness made it 
easier to see crime than when Blackness was absent. 
In a parallel study, participants were brought into the lab and 
subliminally exposed to words related to crime (e.g., arrest, felony, etc.) or 
nonsense letter strings (e.g., xvslpe).56 They were then presented with a 
 
1988); Devine, supra note 20, at 5–6; Susan T. Fiske & Steven L. Neuberg, A Continuum of 
Impression Formation from Category-Based to Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and 
Motivation on Attention and Interpretation, 23 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 1 
(1990). 
 46. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 168; Susan T. Fiske et al., The Continuum Model: Ten Years 
Later, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 16, at 232–34. 
 47. Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 40, at 466–67; Devine, supra note 20, at 5–6; 
Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 1464–65. 
 48. See generally Eberhardt et al., supra note 8; Goff et al., supra note 9. 
 49. See Eberhardt et al., supra note 8. 
 50. Id. at 880. 
 51. Id. at 879. 
 52. Id. at 878. 
 53. Id. at 878–79. 
 54. Id. at 880–81. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 885–88. 
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black male and white male face, equidistant from the mid-point of the 
screen.57 After a few seconds, these faces disappeared and a faint dot 
appeared where one of the two faces had been.58 Participants were told to 
indicate whether the dot appeared on the left- or right-hand side of the 
screen.59 
In this research paradigm, a participant’s reaction time was a proxy for 
their attentional bias. That is, if they were faster to indicate where the dot 
was when it appeared behind the white face as opposed to the black face, 
then they were likely looking more closely at the white face, and vice versa. 
The research demonstrated that when participants (who were mostly White) 
saw nonsense words, they tended to stare at the white face more than the 
black face—a kind of “in-group” bias.60 However, when participants were 
first exposed to words related to crime, they were far faster to find the dot 
behind the black face than the white face.61 In other words, thinking of 
crime made participants look towards black faces. 
These two studies provide evidence of a reciprocal relationship between 
race and crime. That is, as “Black” activates thoughts of criminality, so too 
does criminality activate thoughts of Blackness, each strengthening the 
association between the two. 
Again, while conscious effort can mobilize System 2, allowing us to 
perceive individuals more deliberately, there are a host of contexts that 
make this more difficult.62 For instance, when individuals are cognitively 
depleted—say, they are tired after a long drive—they are more likely to rely 
on automatic processes (e.g., stereotypes) regardless of how dedicated they 
may be to non-racist values.63 Similarly, if one is distracted,64 anxious,65 or 
 
 57. Importantly, these faces were pre-tested to be equally attractive and equally 
stereotypical of their respective races. Id. at 886. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 887. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Brewer, supra note 45, at 1–36; Devine, supra note 20, at 15–16; Fiske et al., supra note 
46, at 236; Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and 
Application of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 509, 510 (1991). 
 63. Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypes as Judgmental Heuristics: Evidence of Circadian 
Variations in Discrimination, 1 PSYCHOL. SCI. 319, 319 (1990); Devine, supra note 20, at 16; C. 
Neil Macrae, Galen V. Bodenhausen & Alan B. Milne, Saying No to Unwanted Thoughts: Self-Focus 
and the Regulation of Mental Life, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 578, 587 (1998); Mark 
Muraven & Roy F. Baumeister, Self-Regulation and Depletion of Limited Resources: Does Self-Control 
Resemble a Muscle?, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 247, 247–48 (2000); William von Hippel, Lisa A. Silver 
& Molly E. Lynch, Stereotyping Against Your Will: The Role of Inhibitory Ability in Stereotyping and 
Prejudice Among the Elderly, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 523, 523–24, 530 (2000). 
 64. See Gilbert & Hixon, supra note 62, at 512. 
 65. Jennifer A. Richeson & J. Nicole Shelton, Negotiating Interracial Interactions: Costs, 
Consequences, and Possibilities, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 316, 318 (2007). 
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just feeling badly about one’s self,66 one is more likely to rely on automatic 
associations, thus increasing reliance on stereotypes. Perhaps most 
distressing in the case of stereotypes regarding race and crime is that simply 
engaging in cross-race interactions can be sufficiently anxiety-provoking—
particularly among well-meaning individuals—to prevent them from using 
System 2 processes.67 Consequently, though our minds come equipped with 
the capacity to interrogate our thoughts, they can fail to function optimally 
where issues of identity and stereotypes are concerned. 
Obviously, this is relevant to issues of determining guilt and 
“dangerousness,” as perceptions of even law enforcement professionals can 
be influenced by these implicit biases. However, these biases can influence 
more than just perceptions—they can directly influence behaviors as well. 
When implicit associations influence behavior beneath awareness (i.e., 
behaviors that happen either too quickly to be controlled, or behaviors 
motivated by unconscious processes), this is called an ideomotor effect, to 
which we will now turn our attentions. 
When criminal stereotypes are activated, they can result in people 
acting more aggressively than they might otherwise. This ideomotor effect 
often occurs without any conscious awareness that one is behaving in this 
way. For instance, in one study demonstrating this effect, researchers had 
subjects complete an extremely long and tedious computer task consisting of 
130 trials.68 Before each one, the participants were primed below the level of 
conscious awareness with photos depicting the face of either a black or white 
individual. 
Researchers rigged the computers so that, on the last trial, the 
computer program would crash and the subjects would be told to begin the 
entire task again.69 Their reactions to this news were videotaped and later 
coded for hostility. The results demonstrated that those primed with 
pictures of black faces reacted with more hostility to the news, regardless of 
their racial attitudes.70 The researchers concluded that the prime activated 
associations linked to aggression, which then tipped the balance in favor of a 
more aggressive response to the unwelcome news.71 
 
 66. Steven Fein & Steven J. Spencer, Prejudice as Self-Image Maintenance: Affirming the Self 
Through Derogating Others, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 31, 31 (1997). 
 67. Phillip Atiba Goff, Claude M. Steele & Paul G. Davies, The Space Between Us: Stereotype 
Threat and Distance in Interracial Contexts, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 91 (2008); 
Richeson & Shelton, supra note 65, at 318; Jacquie D. Vorauer, Kelley J. Main & Gordon B. 
O’Connell, How Do Individuals Expect To Be Viewed by Members of Lower Status Groups? Content and 
Implications of Meta-stereotypes, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917, 933–34 (1998). 
 68. John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and 
Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 238 (1996). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 238–39. 
 71. Id. at 239. 
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Ideomotor effects generated by racial stereotypes are also implicated in 
the work of several researchers who study reactions to simulated shooter 
tasks.72 In one study, researchers asked both civilians and officers to shoot 
armed individuals and to refrain from shooting unarmed individuals using 
buttons labeled “shoot” and “don’t shoot.”73 This design permitted 
researchers to test two alternative forms of bias. On the one hand, 
individuals might accidentally shoot more unarmed black than unarmed 
white suspects. On the other hand, individuals could simply be faster to 
shoot armed black than armed white suspects. 
Results of this research revealed that both civilians and officers 
demonstrated a similar degree of racial bias when it came to the speed of 
their decision-making. That is, both shot armed black suspects faster than 
armed white suspects.74 However, unlike civilians, who also shot more 
unarmed black than unarmed white suspects, officers were able to inhibit a 
racial bias in favor of shooting undeserving black targets—evidence that 
training can reduce automatic racial biases in some cases. 
However, in other research conducted by one of the authors of this 
Essay, training was not as helpful. In a study on the role of implicit 
dehumanization—the automatic association between Blacks and apes—
researchers found that the degree to which officers associated Blacks with 
apes predicted both the degree to which they misperceived black children as 
adults and justified violence against them.75 In this study, officers were 
brought into a laboratory and took an implicit association test,76 a test of 
how strongly an individual associates two concepts—in this case, Blacks and 
apes. Afterwards, they were shown a photo array of black, white, and latino 
juveniles who were suspected of various crimes. Officers were asked to guess 
how old each juvenile was. This research revealed that not only did officers 
perceive black children as significantly older than they actually were, but an 
officer’s implicit association of Blacks with apes was a significant predictor of 
that over-estimation.77 In other words, the more officers implicitly associated 
Blacks with apes, the more likely they were to see a black child as a black 
adult. However, the officers’ implicit associations did not affect perceptions 
of the age of either latino or white youths.78 
 
 72. Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity To Disambiguate 
Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1317–18 (2002). 
 73. Id. at 1316; see also B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and Unintended 
Stereotyping, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 287, 288 (2006) (noting that split-second 
decisions limit individual ability to control for racial bias caused by racial stereotypes).  
 74. Correll et al., supra note 9, at 1020. 
 75. Phillip Atiba Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing 
Black Children (Aug. 15, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
 76. Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 1464–65. 
 77. Goff et al., supra note 75, at 46–47. 
 78. Id. at 22–23. 
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After completing the study, the research team was granted access to 
each officer’s use-of-force history with juveniles. These data led to the most 
disturbing finding of all—that an officer’s implicit association between 
Blacks and apes led to higher rates of racial disparity in the use of force 
against black juveniles. That is, the more an officer associated Blacks with 
apes, the more they used force against black (but not white or latino) 
suspects.79 
These data suggest that implicit bias can sometimes prove resistant to 
the gentling effects of introspection (i.e., System 2). Though using 
guidelines, such as “stop and think” or “use a checklist,” to safeguard against 
predictable System 1 errors does tend to reduce those errors,80 and 
encouraging introspection also curbs important and predictable System 1 
biases,81 that should not be taken as evidence that the “silver bullet” for 
fixing these errors is simply slowing down. Rather, we suggest that “stopping 
and thinking” is merely one tool in the arsenal that we can use to reduce 
systematic errors caused by fast-thinking and intuitive mental processes. 
C. THE CONSTRUCT 
The suspicion heuristic is a construct that relies upon the mind science 
of heuristics and biases on the one hand,82 and implicit racial associations 
on the other,83 to explain how merely perceiving race—even absent racial 
animus—can influence judgments of criminality beyond conscious 
awareness. Before developing the suspicion heuristic, we will first discuss the 
mental shortcuts people use when called upon to make difficult assessments 
in general. Then, we will apply these lessons to situations in which people 
are asked to make judgments in the context of suspicion. 
1. In General 
As previously mentioned, individuals typically resort to heuristics when 
faced with a difficult judgment.84 Because the judgment is complex, System 
1 substitutes an easier, but related, assessment instead.85 Substitution of 
easier questions occurs non-consciously. And, because the answer to the 
 
 79. Id. at 23–27. 
 80. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 12, at 15; see also Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, 
at 1124–31. 
 81. See Margo J. Monteith et al., Putting the Brakes on Prejudice: On the Development and 
Operation of Cues for Control, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1029, 1032, 1038–39 (2002). 
 82. See supra Part I.A. 
 83. See supra Part I.B. 
 84. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 
13, at 53. 
 85. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and 
Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163–64 (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); see also Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 13, at 53. 
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heuristic question comes to mind quickly and easily, people are unaware 
that they answered a question that was not asked. Indeed, people likely will 
not even realize that the initial judgment was difficult because an intuitive 
answer readily came to mind.86 
In their work, Tversky and Kahneman discovered that the use of 
heuristics is common when individuals make assessments of probability.87 
They found that both lay people and statistical experts often rest these 
judgments on their intuitions rather than on the laws of probability.88 For 
instance, consideration of base rates (the pervasiveness of an item or 
phenomenon in the world) is important when determining the likelihood of 
uncertain events.89 But, instead of considering base rates, people asked to 
assess the likelihood of uncertain events may substitute a judgment of 
similarity instead.90 For example, when asked to judge the likelihood that a 
certain person is a lawyer, people may rest their predictions on how similar 
the person is to their stereotype of lawyers.91 This substitution of the 
similarity or protypicality question for the probability question is known as 
the representativeness heuristic.92 The representativeness heuristic can cause 
significant errors because people fail to account for factors that should 
influence their probability judgments.93 
Another heuristic that can affect probability judgments is known as the 
availability heuristic.94 When people utilize the availability heuristic, their 
judgments of probability are influenced by how easily and quickly similar 
instances to the one at issue come to mind (i.e., how “available” or salient a 
 
 86. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 99. Kahneman gives some examples of substitution. If you 
are asked, “How happy are you with your life these days?” The question you will likely answer 
instead is, “What is my mood right now.” Id. at 98. If asked, “How popular will the president be 
six months from now?” The easier question you will answer instead is, “How popular is the 
president right now?” Id. at 98. 
 87. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, at 1124.  
 88. For an extended discussion, see id. at 1130. 
 89. Id. at 1124–25. Another factor people may fail to consider is predictability, which 
refers to the degree to which accurate predictions are possible. Id. at 1126.  
 90. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, 
3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430, 432–33 (1972).  
 91. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 90, at 451 (“The likelihood that a particular 12-year-
old boy will become a scientist, for example, may be evaluated by the degree to which the role 
of a scientist is representative of our image of the boy.”); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, at 
1124 (“In the representative heuristic, the probability that [a certain person] is a librarian, for 
example, is assessed by the degree to which he is representative of, or similar to, the stereotype 
of a librarian.”). 
 92. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 90, at 433. For an extended discussion of 
representativeness, see generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by 
Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 85, at 
84. 
 93. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, in JUDGMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 85, at 49–51. 
 94. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, at 1127.  
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prior event is).95 For example, people’s judgments of the probability that 
they will be involved in a serious car accident may be affected by how 
recently they witnessed or read about an automobile fatality. Substitution of 
availability for probability can also result in serious errors because, again, 
people using the availability heuristic ignore the laws of chance. 
People likely utilize the availability heuristic in social situations because 
they often do not have “complete, reliable, [and] predictive information” 
about the individuals they encounter.96 The availability heuristic, then, helps 
people to make judgments and predictions about others when full 
information is absent.97 However, because people’s pre-existing “beliefs and 
values foster preconceptions that heighten the availability of certain 
evidence,” the availability heuristic can lead to errors in judgment.98 
An example can help one distinguish between availability and 
representativeness: 
[W]hen asked to evaluate the relative frequency of cocaine use in 
Hollywood actors, one may assess how easy it is to retrieve examples 
of celebrity drug-users—the availability heuristic piggybacks on 
highly efficient memory retrieval processes. When evaluating the 
likelihood that a given comic actor is a cocaine user, one may assess 
the similarity between that actor and the prototypical cocaine user 
(the representativeness heuristic piggybacks on automatic pattern-
matching processes).99 
People are generally unaware that they have substituted representativeness 
and availability judgments for probability judgments because System 1 
makes these heuristic substitutions quickly and automatically.100 
Furthermore, the use of heuristics and the errors associated with them occur 
even when individuals are asked to be as accurate as possible or are given 
rewards for correct answers.101 
2. Judgments of Criminality 
Like other probability judgments, predicting the likelihood that a 
person is dangerous is extremely difficult—especially when the other is a 
 
 95. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and 
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208 (1973). As Tversky and Kahneman wrote, “A person 
is said to employ the availability heuristic whenever he estimates frequency or probability by the 
ease with which instances or associations could be brought to mind.” Id. at 208. 
 96. Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction, in JUDGMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 85, at 190–91. 
 97. Id. at 191. 
 98. Id. at 191–92. 
 99. Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction—Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now, in 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 13, at 3. 
 100. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 159. 
 101. Id. 
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stranger. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that people do not have 
the luxury of time to gather as much information as possible about the 
person being assessed and to engage in the deliberate, systematic processing 
of the evidence since hesitating may create a risk of injury or death. Faced 
with a potentially life-threatening situation, people are unlikely to take the 
time necessary for deductive reasoning. Rather, they will make their 
judgments of criminality quickly, based upon only small slices of behavior, 
under highly stressful circumstances. In this context, it would not be 
surprising if people made their assessments of criminality using the 
representativeness and availability heuristics. This substitution of 
representativeness and availability in the context of judgments of criminality 
(we use the phrase “judgments of criminality” to refer to the assessment that 
another is engaged in criminal activity or poses a threat) is what we term the 
“suspicion heuristic.” 
Use of the suspicion heuristic cannot help but disadvantage Blacks. This 
is because Blacks serve as our mental prototype (i.e., stereotype) for the 
violent street criminal.102 Furthermore, the tendency for black suspects to be 
over-represented in media portrayals of violent street crime103 makes the 
Black-as-criminal stereotype readily available. 
However, heuristic errors in determinations of suspicion can also 
burden other groups stereotyped as criminal in certain situations because 
what triggers the suspicion heuristic is the existence of the stereotype. For 
instance, Latinos (or those appearing to be) are stereotyped as drug dealers, 
gang members, and undocumented immigrants;104 people believed to be 
 
 102. Correll et al., supra note 72, at 1314–15; Danny Osborne, Perceived Stereotypicality 
and Eyewitness Memory: Does the Type of Crime Affect Eyewitness Identifications? 62–63 (May 
27, 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles) (on file with 
authors); see also Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J. Elliot, Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading? The 
Princeton Trilogy Revisited, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1139, 1139–44 (1995); Birt L. 
Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of 
Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 591 (1976); Jennifer L. Eberhardt 
et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 876 
(2004) (“The stereotype of Black Americans as violent and criminal has been documented by 
social psychologists for almost 60 years.”); Sophie Trawalter et al., Attending to Threat: Race-Based 
Patterns of Selective Attention, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1322, 1322 (2008) (“There is 
overwhelming evidence that young Black men are stereotyped as violent, criminal, and 
dangerous . . . both implicitly as well as explicitly.”) (citations omitted). 
 103. See Gregg Hoffmann, Racial Stereotyping in the News: Some General Semantics Alternatives, 
48 ETC: REV. GEN. SEMANTICS 22, 23 (1991), available at http://www.generalsemantics.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/articles/etc/ 48-1-hoffmann.pdf; Kang, supra note 35, at 1556–57 
(noting that media violent crime stories can exacerbate implicit biases). See generally Travis L. 
Dixon & Cristina L. Azocar, Priming Crime and Activating Blackness: Understanding the Psychological 
Impact of the Overrepresentation of Blacks as Lawbreakers on Television News, 57 J. COMM. 229, 229 
(2007); Travis L. Dixon & Daniel Linz, Race and the Misrepresentation of Victimization on Local 
Television News, 27 COMM. RES. 547, 548 (2000). 
 104. Lee, supra note 3, at 441–44. 
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Muslim are stereotyped as terrorists;105 and Whites are stereotyped as drug 
buyers when they are in nonwhite neighborhoods.106 
Although it is easy and familiar to resort to conscious racial bias to 
explain racial errors in judgments of criminality, the suspicion heuristic can 
explain how these mistakes occur even in the absence of a consciously biased 
actor. Imagine egalitarian-minded individuals walking down a dark street at 
night. It would not be surprising for them to think about the possibility of 
being mugged or attacked. Although they are not aware of it, simply 
thinking about crime may automatically trigger the link between non-Whites 
and criminality below the level of conscious awareness.107 As a result, their 
attention is more likely to be drawn to non-Whites present in the 
environment—a type of unconscious racial profiling.108 Notice, then, that 
even before individuals make a judgment of criminality, they may subject 
non-Whites to greater scrutiny. This can occur regardless of whether 
individuals intend it.109 
Once their attention is captured, they will make a judgment about the 
likelihood that the stranger is engaged in criminal activity. However, they 
may substitute a judgment of how closely this person resembles a criminal 
stereotype instead. Hence, if the person being judged is non-White, 
individuals are more likely to make a mistaken judgment of criminality. 
The suspicion heuristic can bias individuals’ judgments even if they 
consciously reject the stereotype. The decisions of the best-intentioned 
individuals may be affected by the mere existence of the stereotype because 
of the associative networks our minds use to process information. That is, 
merely being aware of the stereotype is sufficient to be influenced by it in 
ways that disadvantage those stereotyped as criminal, regardless of the 
perceiver’s intentions or character. Even worse, people’s heuristic-
criminality judgment will feel easy, familiar, and true because they cannot 
evaluate information processes that proceed beneath awareness. 
Importantly, we do not dispute the existence of bad actors. Yet, the 
precipitous decline in explicit racial bias over the past quarter century110 
suggests that errors in judgments of criminality that disproportionately affect 
 
 105. Holning Lau, Identity Scripts & Democratic Deliberation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 897, 922–23, 
969–70 (2010). 
 106. I. Bennett Capers, Developments in the Law—Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 43, 68–69 (2009); Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1472, 1517 (1988). 
 107. See Eberhardt et al., supra note 8, at 876 passim. 
 108. See id. (discussing attentional bias). 
 109. See id. 
 110. Lawrence Bobo, Whites’ Opposition to Busing: Symbolic Racism or Realistic Group Conflict?, 
45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1196, 1196 (1983); John F. Dovidio, On the Nature of 
Contemporary Prejudice: The Third Wave, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 829, 834 (2001); Goff, Steele & Davies, 
supra note 67, at 91; see, e.g., Philip Perlmutter, The Decline of Bigotry in America, 46 SOC. 517 
(2009). 
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non-Whites may resist explanations that reduce to “people are racist.” The 
suspicion heuristic, in contrast, provides an equally compelling explanation 
for these patterns without relying on a theory of dwindling racial bigotry. 
The suspicion heuristic provides a more nuanced explanation for the racial 
disparities that continue to plague judgments of criminality—and does so 
without the preoccupation with bigotry that obscures the pervasive problem 
of non-conscious bias. The explanation is one that does not rely upon the 
fiction of the objective decision-maker or the scapegoat of the consciously 
biased actor. The suspicion heuristic can account for the reproduction of 
disparities of all types, even in the absence of culpable motives on the part of 
the decision-maker. 
No doubt this explanation is more troubling than one that relies upon 
the bad-actor model because it means that even well-intentioned people can 
make these erroneous judgments. Nevertheless, the suspicion heuristic 
framework is consistent with over four decades of research into how humans 
think, process information, and make judgments. Thus, we should contend 
with its effects on judgments of criminality rather than remaining mired in 
antiqued lay theories of human nature.111 
Now, one might imagine that if people encounter individuals who do 
not fit the criminal stereotype more often than individuals who do, this will 
affect the availability heuristic. However, this conclusion is based on the 
assumption that our memories are pristine—an assumption that finds 
contradictory evidence in literature on memory generally, and implicit 
biases in particular. This research provides evidence that people are more 
likely to remember events that are consistent with their pre-existing beliefs 
and expectations.112 Given the social construction of crime as racially 
Black,113 people are more likely to both consciously and non-consciously 
associate Blacks with criminality. What this means is that people are more 
likely to recall evidence of Black criminality than instances when that 
stereotype was proven false. 
Worse still, the representativeness heuristic may bias individuals in favor 
of remembering more stereotypical members of a group (e.g., dark-skinned 
Blacks) as suspects—even when they were not.114 For instance, in work 
conducted by Eberhardt and one of this Essay’s authors, police officers 
 
 111. See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment 
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1062 (2006). 
 112. Myron Rothbart et al., Recall for Confirming Events: Memory Processes and the Maintenance 
of Social Stereotypes, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 343, 344 (1979); see also ZIVA KUNDA, 
SOCIAL COGNITION 130 (1999) (“Much of what we ‘learn’ from experience may reflect our 
prior theories about reality rather than the actual nature of reality.”); Claudia E. Cohen, Person 
Categories and Social Perception: Testing Some Boundaries of the Processing Effects of Prior Knowledge, 40 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 441, 441 (1981) (describing a study in which subjects were 
more likely to remember stereotype-consistent information). 
 113. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text. 
 114. Eberhardt et al., supra note 8, at 888–89. 
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reliably remembered a more racially stereotypically black suspect and a less 
racially stereotypical white suspect as having committed a crime.115 Officers 
in this study were presented with the picture of an alleged criminal, and 
read about the crime he committed. Half of the officers saw a white criminal 
and the other half a black criminal. After a brief period, officers were given a 
surprise recall task and asked to pick the suspect out of a lineup. The lineup 
consisted of five faces, each pre-tested as equally attractive, but varying in 
racial stereotypicality. Two of the faces were more racially stereotypical than 
the target suspect, and two were less racially stereotypical. The results 
confirmed that, though officer recall was generally high (that is, they usually 
picked the right suspect), to the degree that they “got it wrong” and 
misidentified the suspect, they tended to pick out more racially stereotypical 
black suspects and less racially stereotypical white suspects. 
Imagine, then, that two men—one obviously Black, the other racially 
ambiguous—are seen running from a convenience store after a robbery. 
Both are wearing stereotypically “black” clothes (e.g., sagged jeans, an 
oversized white t-shirt, and a sports jersey). Not only is an officer arriving to 
the scene likely to pay more attention to the unambiguously black suspect,116 
but that officer is also likely to remember that black suspect as the person of 
greatest interest after the fact—regardless of whether or not he was the 
culprit. 
The suspicion heuristic gives us a basis for believing that non-Whites will 
be judged as criminal more often, regardless of whether they are actually 
engaged in criminal activity. This judgment will be consistent with System 1’s 
default intuitive position where non-Whites are concerned. For those not 
stereotyped as criminal, it will take more unambiguous evidence of 
criminality before that judgment will be made.117 Stated another way, linking 
non-Whites with criminality is cognitively easy, while linking Whites with 
criminality is cognitively more taxing.118 
In sum, the suspicion heuristic posits that, when attempting to predict 
the likelihood that a person poses a threat, individuals may rely upon the 
availability and representativeness heuristics to make that determination. 
Because an intuitive answer to these much easier questions comes to mind 
quickly, most individuals will not even be aware of the substitution. In these 
cases, System 1 heuristic errors combine with implicit racial associations to 
help the perceiver make a decision about ambiguous actors or behaviors. 
And, these quick, non-conscious processes also determine split-second 
decisions about behaviors (e.g., to shout “halt,” call for backup, or discharge 
 
 115. Id. at 886–88. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See Patricia G. Devine et al., The Regulation of Explicit and Implicit Race Bias: The Role of 
Motivations To Respond Without Prejudice, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 835 (2002). 
 118. Of course, this general statement has exceptions. For instance, it is likely cognitively 
easier to link Whites with white-collar crimes than non-Whites.  
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a weapon). Furthermore, the suspicion heuristic explains how mere 
knowledge of ubiquitous criminal stereotypes can cause pernicious errors in 
judgment and perception, regardless of whether the individuals involved 
believe or subscribe to the stereotype. 
Considering the implications of the suspicion heuristic on judgments of 
criminality provides important insights into the law of self-defense—one 
doctrine that relies upon the reasonableness of these criminality judgments. 
The doctrine rests in large part upon judging whether an actor’s belief that 
s/he faces an imminent threat of unlawful force is reasonable.119 In Part II, 
we consider the implications of the suspicion heuristic for the doctrine of 
self-defense. The intent of this Essay is to begin thinking about how the 
suspicion heuristic should influence thinking about that doctrine and to 
trace the broad outlines of a new approach. 
II. SELF-DEFENSE AND THE SUSPICION HEURISTIC 
The typical self-defense statute allows non-aggressors to use deadly force 
to protect themselves from the imminent use of deadly and unlawful force 
by another.120 A majority of jurisdictions require that a person’s belief 
regarding the necessity of using force be both honest and reasonable.121 
Stated differently, the defense is recognized even if a person uses deadly 
force against an innocent victim, as long as the individual actually believed 
deadly force was necessary and the mistake was reasonable. 
The suspicion heuristic demonstrates how easily honest—but 
mistaken—beliefs can occur when the person being judged fits a criminal 
stereotype. That is because an individual deciding whether or not self-
defensive actions are necessary must make a quick judgment of criminality 
(i.e., an intuitive assessment about whether the use of deadly force against 
her/him is imminent). This is precisely the situation likely to trigger the 
suspicion heuristic. In other words, the actor may well substitute 
representativeness and availability questions for the probability-of-criminality 
question. When the person being judged fits a criminal stereotype, the 
suspicion heuristic can cause the actor more easily to believe honestly—but 
mistakenly—that the person poses a threat and that deadly force is necessary 
 
 119. See infra Part II.A. 
 120. See People v. Brown, 952 N.E.2d 32, 43 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). The Model Penal Code 
does not require imminence. Rather, it requires that the use of force be “immediately 
necessary.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (2012). 
 121. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 225 (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter 
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING]; John F. Wagner Jr., Standard for Determination of Reasonableness of 
Criminal Defendant’s Belief, for Purposes of Self-Defense Claim, that Physical Force Is Necessary—Modern 
Cases, 73 A.L.R. 4th 993, 996 (1989). Only four jurisdictions utilize a purely subjective test. 
Caroline Forell, What’s Reasonable: Self-Defense and Mistake in Criminal and Tort Law, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 1401, 1404 (2010). 
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and appropriate to repel it. These erroneous judgments can occur 
regardless of the actor’s conscious racial attitudes and beliefs. 
Consider, as an example, the tragic shooting death of Yoshihiro Hattori. 
Hattori was a sixteen-year-old Japanese exchange student living with a white 
family in Louisiana.122 One night in October, he and Webb Haymaker, a 
member of his host family, were on their way to a Halloween party.123 
Hattori was dressed as John Travolta (à la Saturday Night Fever), wearing a 
white tuxedo jacket and carrying a small black camera.124 Haymaker was 
dressed as a car-accident victim.125 
The two got lost and mistook the home of Rodney and Bonnie Peairs as 
the location of the party.126 They rang the doorbell, but when no one 
answered, the boys walked around to the carport.127 At that moment, Mrs. 
Peairs opened the door.128 She saw Haymaker first, but when Hattori 
rounded the corner, she screamed, slammed the door shut, and yelled out 
to her husband to “[g]et the gun.”129 
The boys began to walk away, still in search of the Halloween party.130 
They were on the sidewalk, approximately ten yards away from the home,131 
when Mr. Peairs ran outside with his laser-scoped .44 Smith & Wesson 
Magnum.132 Hattori, who spoke broken English, turned around and began 
to walk back towards Mr. Peairs, saying that they were there for the party.133 
Mr. Peairs yelled “Freeze!” but Hattori did not understand what that word 
meant.134 When Hattori continued to approach, Mr. Peairs fired one shot, 
killing Hattori.135 The entire event, from the time Mr. Peairs opened his 
door, lasted about three seconds.136 A jury found Mr. Peairs’s belief that he 
was in imminent danger reasonable and acquitted him.137 
People can speculate about whether racism played a role in Hattori’s 
tragic and needless death. But while it is tempting to fixate on the spectacle 
of Mr. Peairs’s potentially racist intentions, the operation of the suspicion 
heuristic suggests that using race as a proxy for suspicion is not unusual or 
 
 122. See Hattori v. Peairs, 662 So. 2d 509, 511–13 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
 123. Id. at 511. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 511–12. 
 127. Id. at 511. 
 128. Id. at 512. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. LEE, supra note 2, at 167. 
 132. Hattori, 662 So. 2d at 512. 
 133. LEE, supra note 2, at 168. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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unexpected, and can happen both consciously and non-consciously. Even if 
Mr. Peairs was a well-intentioned man, under time pressure, the suspicion 
heuristic could cause him to see Hattori’s camera as a gun and to interpret 
Hattori’s failure to stop as evidence of aggression. 
The suspicion heuristic can also provide insights into the shooting 
death of Trayvon Martin, a seventeen-year-old black teen.138 Based upon the 
undisputed evidence, Martin was on his way back to the home of his father’s 
fiancée on the evening of February 26th after purchasing items at a 
convenience store.139 He was unarmed, carrying Skittles and an iced tea.140 
George Zimmerman, a Neighborhood Watch volunteer, spotted him and 
became immediately suspicious.141 
Zimmerman called the local police department and reported seeing “a 
real suspicious guy.”142 He indicated that the individual was “just walking 
around looking about” and “looks like he’s up to no good or he’s on drugs 
or something.”143 Zimmerman then reported that the individual was staring 
and coming towards him.144 Next, he described the individual running 
“down toward the other entrance of the neighborhood.”145 At this point, the 
dispatcher asked Zimmerman if he was in pursuit and Zimmerman 
responded that he was.146 The dispatcher replied, “We don’t need you to do 
that,” to which Zimmerman answered, “OK.”147 There is some dispute about 
 
 138. Karen McVeigh, Trayvon Martin’s Death: The Story So Far, GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2012, 
5:53 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/20/trayvon-martin-death-story-so-far. 
 139. Amy Goodman & Denis Moynihan, Walking While Black: The Killing of Trayvon Martin, 
DEMOCRACY NOW! (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.democracynow.org/blog/2012/3/22/ 
walking_while_black_the_killing_of_trayvon_martin; Matt Gutman & Seni Tienabeso, Trayvon 
Martin’s Last Phone Call Triggers Demand for Arrest, ABC NEWS (Mar. 20, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/trayvon-martin-arrest-now-abc-reveals-crucial-phone/story?id= 
15959017#.UEJqcUI8F-U.  
 140. Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed, The Curious Case of Trayvon Martin, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/opinion/blow-the-curious-case-of-trayvon-martin. 
html. 
 141. Rene Stutzman, Police: Zimmerman Says Trayvon Decked Him with One Blow then Began 
Hammering His Head, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 26, 2012), http://articles.orlandosentinel. 
com/2012-03-26/news/os-trayvon-martin-zimmerman-account-20120326_1_miami-schools-
punch-unarmed-black-teenager. 
 142. Isabelle Zehnder, George Zimmerman’s 911 Call Transcribed, EXAMINER.COM (Mar. 24, 
2012), www.examiner.com/article/george-zimmerman-s-911-call-transcribed.  
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. Zimmerman also said that the individual had “his hands in his waist band,” was 
going “to check [Zimmerman] out,” and had “something in his hands.” Id. Shortly after, 
Zimmerman exclaimed, “These assholes. They always get away.” Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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whether Zimmerman continued to follow the person we now know to be 
Martin, or if Martin approached Zimmerman.148 
Zimmerman’s conversation with police dispatch lasted approximately 
four minutes.149 Then, four minutes after he ended his conversation,150 
Martin was dead and Zimmerman admitted to killing him151 with the “black 
Kel Tek 9mm” semi-automatic handgun he had in his possession.152 
People will inevitably disagree on the question of whether Zimmerman 
is a racist. The answer to this question may help us determine just how 
morally blameworthy Zimmerman is. What should be clear, however, is that 
the suspicion heuristic could have affected his judgment that Martin posed a 
threat—regardless of Zimmerman’s conscious racial beliefs. Martin certainly 
fit the stereotype of a dangerous thug—an unknown, young black male, 
dressed in a hoodie, walking down a street at night. And this insight is 
profoundly more disturbing than believing that only consciously biased 
actors would make this mistaken judgment. 
The Subparts that follow trace the broad outlines of an approach to 
mistakes in self-defense cases that implicate the suspicion heuristic. These 
are cases where there is reason to believe that the actor’s mistaken judgment 
was influenced by his or her non-conscious criminal stereotypes of the 
victim.153 This analysis is important because the current doctrine’s treatment 
of mistake would lead to anomalous results in suspicion heuristic cases. 
Subpart A considers whether mistakes facilitated by the suspicion 
heuristic should be considered reasonable or unreasonable. This inquiry is 
critical because in a majority of jurisdictions the defense is unavailable if the 
 
 148. According to the Affidavit of Probable Cause, Zimmerman did continue to follow 
Martin. Affidavit of Probable Cause–Second Degree Murder at 2, State v. Zimmerman, SA No. 
1712F04573 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 11, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2012/04/12/us/13shooter-document.html. However, in a recent interview, Zimmerman says 
that he did move to a different location, but then Martin approached him “with 
‘confrontational’ body language.” Marylynn Ryan & Michael Martinez, George Zimmerman, 
Trayvon Martin Case Update: Recent Interview Could Backfire in Court for Zimmerman, NEWS CHANNEL 
5 (July 26, 2012), http://www.wptv.com/dpp/news/national/george-zimmerman-travyon-martin- 
case-update-recent-interview-could-backfire-in-court-for-zimmerman. Even if we credit 
Zimmerman’s version, which prosecutors say contradicts the statements of witnesses, it still does 
not address the question of why Zimmerman did not simply drive away. 
 149. Eric Zorn, Trayvon Martin and the Problematic Timeline, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 18, 2012), 
http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/news_columnists_ezorn/2012/04/trayvon-martin-and-the-
problematic-timeline.html (noting that the call ended at approximately 7:13 PM); Zehnder, 
supra, note 142. 
 150. RICARDO AYALA, SANFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT REPORT (2012), available at http:// 
www.wagist.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Twin-Lakes-Shooting-Initial-Report.pdf 
(noting that the first officers arrived at the scene at 7:17 PM). 
 151. Affidavit of Probable Cause, supra note 148, at 2. 
 152. AYALA, supra note 150, at 3.  
 153. The suspicion heuristic will not always result in mistaken judgments, i.e. outcome 
error. However, in this Essay, we only concern ourselves with cases in which a mistaken 
judgment of criminality is made. 
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mistake was unreasonable. This Subpart concludes that mistakes based upon 
the suspicion heuristic should always be considered unreasonable. However, 
as Subpart B explains, unreasonable mistakes in suspicion heuristic cases 
should not preclude the defense. Rather, the defendant should be convicted 
of manslaughter instead of murder under the doctrine of imperfect self-
defense. 
A. THE REASONABLENESS DETERMINATION 
In most jurisdictions, the reasonableness of an actor’s honest belief 
about the necessity of using deadly force is judged from the standpoint of 
the objectively reasonable person.154 But, this begs the question: who is this 
fictional reasonable person to whom the defendant should be compared?155 
Within criminal law scholarship, this question has engendered a lively 
debate156—one that is not simply academic. For if the reasonable person is 
the typical, average and ordinary person, then in suspicion heuristic cases, 
individuals whose honest but mistaken judgments were influenced by the 
heuristic would be acquitted. As will be discussed next, this conception of 
reasonableness is inappropriate in cases implicating the heuristic. 
There are two alternative conceptions of reasonableness that self-
defense doctrine could employ—the positivist and the normative.157 The 
positivist model eschews normative questions. It equates the reasonable 
person with the typical, average, or ordinary person and simply asks, “What 
would the ordinary person do in this situation?”158 The normative 
conception adds a value judgment to the inquiry. Under this model, the 
reasonableness question is not only whether the typical person would have 
believed and acted the way the defendant did, but also whether those beliefs 
and actions are appropriate and just. The question answered is “[W]hat 
should the reasonable person do”?159 The normative conception equates the 
 
 154. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 155. But see Victoria Nourse, After the Reasonable Man: Getting Over the Subjectivity/Objectivity 
Question, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 33, 34 (2008) (arguing that “scholars have made an analytic 
mistake in believing that the reasonable man is a person”; rather, “[t]he reasonable man is an 
institutional heuristic” (emphasis omitted)). 
 156. See, e.g., Symposium on the Reasonable Person in Criminal Law, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1 
(2008); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in 
Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177 (1990). 
 157. Professor Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee developed this formulation in her groundbreaking 
article, Race and Self-Defense, supra note 3.  
 158. Id. at 495; see also id. at 387 (comparing the defendant to the “hypothetical reasonable 
person of ‘ordinary intelligence, temperament, and physical and mental attributes’”) (quoting 
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 18.05, at 202 (2d ed. 1995)). This 
positivist conception is the most common model used in the law. Mayo Moran, The Reasonable 
Person: A Conceptual Biography in Comparative Perspective, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233, 1236 
(2010). 
 159. Lee, supra note 3, at 390 (emphasis added). 
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reasonable person with the ideal person—someone who does not act on his 
or her conscious or non-conscious biases. 
Which is the appropriate model where the suspicion heuristic is 
concerned? The answer likely depends in part on whether one subscribes to 
the instrumentalist or non-instrumentalist view of criminal liability.160 In very 
general terms, a non-instrumentalist considers the moral blameworthiness 
or culpability of the actor as the criminal law’s primary concern, while an 
instrumentalist focuses on using the law to promote desirable social 
norms.161 
The non-instrumentalist argument for using the positivist conception of 
reasonableness is that punishment should be reserved for those who make 
mistakes that the average person could have avoided.162 Since the typical 
person cannot avoid operation of the heuristic in circumstances where it is 
likely to be activated, an actor whose mistaken belief was influenced by the 
heuristic is not morally blameworthy and should not be punished. This 
argument for complete exoneration has some appeal, especially given the 
traditional goals of the criminal law to punish only the blameworthy. 
In our view, however, the reasonableness inquiry should encompass 
more than typicality when the suspicion heuristic might influence 
judgments; it should consider normative questions as well. This is 
appropriate for a number of reasons.163 First, typical beliefs are not 
 
 160. See Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and 
Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 815 (1994) (“The conflict between instrumental 
and noninstrumental conceptions of the law stems from the fact that the law has two rather 
antithetical tasks with respect to human behavior: (1) that of adjusting its rules to the 
expectations and intentions [including tacit assumptions] of reasonable persons, and (2) that 
of disciplining behavior and guiding it into proper channels.” (quoting LON L. FULLER & 
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 700, 702 (5th ed. 1990)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 161. Lee, supra note 3, at 381–82. As Jody Armour writes: 
Under the noninstrumental model, the law must take the human animal as he is 
conditioned and simply ask whether society can fairly expect individuals to 
overcome their conditioning under the circumstances. According to the 
instrumentalist view, the law should seek to alter the maze and retrain individuals 
by formulating rules that prevent the stigmatization of blacks, reflect the 
community’s moral aspirations of racial equality, and help eradicate racial 
discrimination.  
Armour, supra note 160, at 815 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 785 n.12 (“Essentially, 
noninstrumentalist conceptions of legal liability focus on the past actions of specific parties, 
while instrumentalist ones focus on the future welfare of society in general.”). 
 162. See Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 30 (1994).  
 163. Joshua Dressler, in the provocation context, has argued that the positivist conception 
of reasonableness can include features of the normative model. He writes: 
If the Ordinary Man standard is to maintain a normative component, it is also 
important that the law assume this person to be devoid of other extreme character 
flaws relevant to the defense. . . . This means that, for purposes of determining 
whether a person is justified in becoming indignant by an otherwise harmless act, 
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necessarily morally correct or just.164 Cynthia Lee makes this point 
powerfully using the examples of slavery and the Japanese internment.165 
While most today consider the institution of slavery and the internment of 
the Japanese unjust, this was not the case at the time. 
Second, characterizing mistakes facilitated by the heuristic as 
reasonable represents a judgment that the mistake is acceptable. However, 
the fact that the average person is at risk of making these erroneous 
judgments does not make it something that society should countenance. On 
the contrary, society should be working towards eliminating racial bias, 
whether conscious or not, rather than determining that it is reasonable 
simply because it is ubiquitous. 
Third, applying the positivist model to cases implicating the suspicion 
heuristic is problematic because the heuristic is pervasive. Thus, people who 
kill innocent, stereotyped individuals based upon the honest but mistaken 
belief that they posed a threat would never be punished. This result would 
reduce the criminal justice system’s legitimacy, especially in the eyes of those 
most likely to bear the brunt of these mistaken judgments. These legitimacy 
problems can have unintended and negative ripple effects throughout the 
entire criminal justice system.166 
In sum, using the positivist conception of reasonableness in suspicion 
heuristic cases would send inappropriate messages about the value of the 
victim’s life and the importance of curbing and eliminating racial biases, 
whether consciously held or not. Rather, the normative conception is more 
appropriate. Under it, mistakes based upon the suspicion heuristic would be 
unreasonable because the ideal person would not have or act on these 
mistaken judgments. The next Subpart considers whether individuals 
making these unreasonable mistakes should be punished, and if so, to what 
extent. 
 
the Ordinary Man is not racist, anti-Semitic, or prejudiced against any class of 
persons. 
Joshua Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, 
Sexual Advances, and the “Reasonable Man” Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726, 757 
(1995).  
 164. Armour, supra note 160, at 790 (“Although in most cases the beliefs and reactions of 
typical people reflect what may fairly be expected of a particular actor, this rule of thumb 
should not be transformed into or confused with a normative or legal principle.”); see also LEE, 
supra note 2, at 235–36. 
 165. LEE, supra note 2, at 236. 
 166. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Capers, supra note 106, 
at 68–69; Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 106, at 1517. 
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B. CLASSIFYING MISTAKEN SELF-DEFENSE167 
In a majority of jurisdictions, self-defense is unavailable for 
unreasonable mistakes, and as a result, the actor is convicted of murder. 
This Subpart considers whether unreasonable mistakes precipitated by the 
suspicion heuristic should be treated similarly. We conclude that they should 
not. Rather, these mistakes should be classified as partial excuses that result 
in reduced punishment. 
1. Justification v. Excuse 
Self-defense is usually considered a justification defense because, 
although using deadly force against another is customarily a crime, in the 
context of self-defense, the act is considered the right thing to do, deserving 
of neither censure nor punishment.168 As H.L.A. Hart writes, “Killing in self-
defence is an exception to a general rule making killing punishable; it is 
admitted because the policy or aims which in general justify the punishment 
of killing (e.g., protection of human life) do not include cases such as 
this.”169 
Much has been written about the difference between justifications and 
excuses in the criminal law.170 In very general terms, a justified act is one 
that “the law does not condemn.”171 Some scholars define these actions as 
encompassing only those that are morally right, and not those that are 
merely “tolerable.”172 Other scholars are more forgiving, including within 
this category acts that are simply permissible.173 The gist of this latter view is 
 
 167. This is a term coined by Reid Fontaine to distinguish between self-defense, where an 
actor is both reasonable and accurate (and thus justified), and those situations in which the 
actor is incorrect in his assessment. Fontaine suggests that “the doctrine of self-defense be 
reframed such that cases in which there is no real defensesuch as in the case of a reasonable 
but erroneous belief of a mortal threatbe excluded and handled under a separate excuse-
based doctrine of mistaken self-defense.” Reid Griffith Fontaine, An Attack on Self-Defense, 47 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 57, 61 (2010). 
 168. Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A 
Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61, 84 (1984); Fontaine, supra 
note 167, at 58.  
 169. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 13 
(1968). 
 170. See, e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978); Dressler, supra note 
168; R. Kent Greenawalt, Violence—Legal Justification and Moral Appraisal, 32 EMORY L.J. 437 
(1983); Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Society Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal 
Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266 (1975). Unfortunately, the constraints of this Essay do not allow 
a full discussion. 
 171. HART, supra note 169, at 13–14. 
 172. George P. Fletcher, Should Intolerable Prison Conditions Generate a Justification or an Excuse 
for Escape?, 26 UCLA L. REV. 1355, 1358–59 (1979). 
 173. Donald Horowitz, Justification and Excuse in the Program of the Criminal Law, 49 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 122 (1986) (writing that justifications are not necessarily “a good thing, 
but merely . . . a tolerable outcome in view of the alternative outcome”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2164797
E1_RICHARDSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/2012 12:00 PM 
322 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:293 
that “what you did was really all right,” even if not ideal.174 The main idea 
behind justifications is that the actor has done the right thing under the 
circumstances; in context, the act is not wrongful, and thus the actor should 
not be punished for engaging in it. 
An excuse, on the other hand, focuses on the actor’s moral 
blameworthiness, and not on the act.175 
When behavior is excused, the law recognizes the behavior as 
wrongful, but does not assign blame to the actor because he is 
considered nonculpable. In recognizing excuse defenses, the law 
recognizes that people may act in socially undesirable ways, yet not 
deserve punishment. The law accepts the inevitable shortcomings 
of human beings who cannot always act in ideal ways.176 
Excuses, then, acknowledge the social harm of the act, but also recognize 
that the actor did not have a “conscious will to do evil.”177 Because the actor 
is not fully responsible for his or her actions based upon some psychological 
or situational characteristic unique to him or her, the actor receives either 
reduced punishment (a partial excuse) or no punishment at all (a full 
excuse).178 
While self-defense is typically considered a justification defense, difficult 
classification issues arise when an actor makes an unreasonable mistake of 
fact regarding the need to use deadly force.179 Is mistaken self-defense still 
 
 174. Greenawalt, supra note 170, at 442–44 (internal quotation marks omitted). Elsewhere, 
Greenawalt has written that justified acts are those that are “warranted” and “morally 
appropriate.” Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 89, 91 (1986); see also Fontaine, supra note 167, at 62 (describing justified acts as 
acceptable or permissible). 
 175. Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the Literature, 
33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1163 (1987) (“Whereas a justification negates the social harm of an 
offense, an excuse negates the moral blameworthiness of the actor for causing the harm.”); 
Horowitz, supra note 173, at 111 (“[Excuses] go, in short, to the mental element in criminal 
liability.”). 
 176. Lee, supra note 3, at 390 (citation omitted). 
 177. Horowitz, supra note 173, at 111 (noting that an excuse “belongs to that part of the 
criminal law that removes from punishment defendants who have intended no wrong.”). As 
Professor Reid Fontaine writes, “an excuse is the combination of an admission that one has 
engaged in wrongdoing that has produced social harm and an exonerating explanation as to 
why he has so acted.” Fontaine, supra note 167, at 66. 
 178. Dressler, supra note 168, at 66 (“[A]n excuse concedes the wrongfulness of the act, 
but asserts that the actor should not be punished for her wrongful behavior, primarily because 
of psychological or situational involuntariness.” (citations omitted)); HART, supra note 169, at 
13–14 (noting that the excusable act “is deplored, but the psychological state of the agent . . . 
rule[s] out the public condemnation and punishment”). 
 179. Some commentators argue that both reasonable and unreasonable mistakes are fully 
excusable. One commentator put it thus: 
If . . . moral stigma is not merely relevant but indeed the only distinguishing factor 
of the criminal law from civil law, it follows that any mistake of fact, no matter how 
unreasonable, should exculpate. Since, by definition, a person who makes even an 
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justifiable when facilitated by the suspicion heuristic? One answer is to 
conclude that these mistakes are neither justifiable nor excusable. The 
problem with this is it would treat individuals whose mistakes are facilitated 
by the heuristic identically to actors who kill with malice. However, the 
former are not as culpable as those “who act while they are not mistaken, 
who know precisely what they are doing, and understand precisely the 
implications and potential results of their acts.”180 Thus, these two groups 
should not receive equal punishment. 
Another option is to treat these mistakes as justifiable. However, this is 
also problematic because 
the perceived offender has acted in no way that would adequately 
change the moral balance of the relationship between the victim 
and killer. As such, the victim has not acted such that he deserves 
to die or in a way that entitles the killer to take his life. . . . [T]here 
exists no characteristic—related to the victim or otherwise—of such 
a scenario that gives rise to entitlement on the part of the killer.181 
Hence, classifying mistaken self-defense as justifiable is inappropriate 
because using deadly force against an innocent victim is not “objectively 
right conduct,”182 even if the mistake was influenced by the heuristic. It is 
not socially desirable or even tolerable to kill, maim, or otherwise mistakenly 
use deadly force against innocent stereotyped individuals simply because 
most people have non-conscious biases against them.183 If these mistaken 
judgments were categorized as justifiable, it would suggest that people are 
privileged to—and should—act in similar ways in analogous situations.184 
 
unreasonable mistake of fact is not as culpable as one who makes no mistake of 
fact but who understands precisely what he is doing, the criminal law should visit 
upon the unreasonably mistaken actor a penalty less severe than that visited upon 
the knowing actor and, indeed, should visit upon him no criminal penalty at all.  
Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: II—Honest but Unreasonable Mistake of Fact in Self 
Defense, 28 B.C. L. REV. 459, 513 (1987); see also Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the 
Criminal Law, 22 HARV. L. REV. 75, 84–85 (1908) (“If the defendant, being mistaken as to 
material facts, is to be punished because his mistake is one which an average man would not 
make, punishment will sometimes be inflicted when the criminal mind does not exist. Such a 
result is contrary to fundamental principles, and is plainly unjust . . . . If the mistake, whether 
reasonable or unreasonable, as judged by an external standard, does negative the criminal 
mind, there should be no conviction.”).  
 180. Singer, supra note 1179, at 513. 
 181. Fontaine, supra note 167, at 61. 
 182. Dressler, supra note 168, at 63 (citing GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 
(1978)). In Dressler’s view, justifications need not always involve “objectively right conduct.” Id. 
at 64. He writes, “Sometimes mistaken conduct can be justified, not merely excused.” Id.  
 183. See infra notes 164–66 and accompanying text. 
 184. Horowitz, supra note 173, at 119 (“To recognize a justification defense is effectively to 
change the law and, at least in some cases, to weaken the prohibitions of the criminal law. For if 
a person in a given situation is justified in doing an act that would otherwise be denominated 
criminal, then all others similarly situated are likewise privileged to do the same act.”). 
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Yet, there is no normatively defensible reason to approve the killing of 
innocents simply because they have the misfortune to be stereotyped as 
criminal185 and the average person likely has non-conscious biases against 
them.186 
Finally, the doctrine could excuse the actor who makes a mistake based 
upon the suspicion heuristic. We conclude that this is the appropriate way to 
handle these honest but unreasonable mistakes of fact. This taxonomy 
recognizes that while the act of using deadly force against innocent victims 
who fit a criminal stereotype is not morally appropriate, the actor’s mistake 
is understandable. The excuse classification acknowledges that these actors 
did not have the conscious intent to engage in wrongful conduct. Rather, 
their mistake was influenced by non-conscious and automatic mental 
processes over which they had little control.187 
Categorizing mistaken self-defense as an excuse does not end the 
inquiry, however. We must still determine whether, in the suspicion heuristic 
context, the excuse should exonerate the actor (a full excuse) or simply 
reduce punishment (a partial excuse). The next Subpart considers this 
question. 
2. A Partial Excuse 
While mistaken judgments in the suspicion heuristic context are 
excusable, the pervasiveness of the heuristic makes it materially different 
from situations where actors are fully excused because of infancy, insanity, 
or some other unique characteristic. These traits are peculiar to the 
individual and thus, “[t]he mental quality of [these] excuse defenses 
prevents their recognition in individual cases from effectively changing the 
law.”188 Not so with the suspicion heuristic. As discussed previously, the 
suspicion heuristic likely affects most individuals, regardless of their 
conscious racial beliefs. 
Because the heuristic is ubiquitous, fully excusing mistaken judgments 
of criminality precipitated by it would essentially immunize the mistaken 
killing of innocent, but stereotyped-as-criminal, individuals from 
punishment. This would tacitly turn mistaken self-defense into a justification 
 
 185. Fontaine, supra note 167, at 62 (noting that it is generally argued that a justified act is 
one that is encouraged and not prohibited). 
 186. See infra notes 164–66 and accompanying text. 
 187. See supra notes 26–27, 80–81 and accompanying text. This also suggests that if 
individuals place themselves in situations where the suspicion heuristic is likely to affect them, 
they might be culpable. There is also evidence that with sufficient motivation and long-term 
practice, individuals can reduce the effects of automatic implicit biases. See Richardson, supra 
note 36, at 2054 (citing studies); id. 2088–97 (discussing possible methods that might reduce 
implicit bias, but noting that, at present, these efforts may not produce long-lasting effects); see 
also Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in 
Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893 (2009).  
 188. Horowitz, supra note 173, at 120. 
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defense. So, while we can understand why mistakes based upon the 
suspicion heuristic might occur, full exoneration of everyone who 
erroneously uses deadly force against those stereotyped as criminal does not 
comport with our common intuitions. 
A partial excuse provides a way to balance the concerns raised by 
punishing the non-culpable actor with a murder conviction on the one hand 
and condoning the use of deadly force precipitated by racial stereotypes 
through complete exoneration on the other.189 A partial excuse recognizes 
that it is not only undesirable to completely forgive the use of deadly force 
against innocents based upon the suspicion heuristic, but also that these 
actors do not deserve full punishment. Rather, some punishment is 
defensible because the law should not condone the taking of an innocent 
life based upon racial stereotypes—consciously held or not. Reduced 
punishment recognizes that using deadly force under these circumstances is 
wrong while also acknowledging the actor’s lack of malicious intent. 
Under current law, the doctrine of imperfect self-defense provides the 
mechanism for treating mistaken self-defense as a partial excuse. Imperfect 
self-defense mitigates murder to voluntary or involuntary manslaughter 
when an actor’s belief is honest but unreasonable.190 However, only a 
minority of jurisdictions recognize the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, 
although this number is growing.191 Based on the analysis in this Essay, we 
believe that the option of imperfect self-defense should be available in all 
jurisdictions. 
3. Operationalizing the Reasonableness Standard 
The discussion thus far has been theoretical. In this Subpart, we 
consider how to apply the normative standard of reasonableness in actual 
cases involving mistaken judgments of criminality. 
First, just like in cases that do not involve mistaken judgments, the 
initial question jurors would have to answer is whether the actor’s belief in 
the necessity of using deadly force was honest. If the jury decides the actor’s 
belief was not honest, then the defendant’s actions are neither justifiable 
nor excusable, and he or she should be convicted of murder. 
However, if the jury finds that the mistaken belief was honest, then it 
must consider whether the actor’s belief was reasonable. How can courts 
operationalize the normative conception of reasonableness? One way would 
be for courts to adopt a modified version of the jury instruction that Lee 
proposes. Her suggested instruction reads, in part, “If the defendant was 
 
 189. Some commentators argue that unreasonable mistakes should not be excused. See, e.g., 
Fontaine, supra note 167 (expressing the view that only reasonable mistakes are excusable with 
one limited exception). 
 190. Dressler, supra note 168, at 85. 
 191. See DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 121, at 234–35. 
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influenced by racial stereotypes, this fact may be considered to support the 
honesty, but not the reasonableness, of the defendant’s beliefs. Reliance on 
racial stereotypes to inform one’s beliefs in a self-defense situation is not 
reasonable as a matter of law.”192 We would add to this instruction language 
to the effect that racial stereotypes can be both conscious and non-
conscious, and that reliance on either type of stereotype is unreasonable as a 
matter of law.193 
Of course, juror decision-making itself may be affected by conscious and 
non-conscious biases. In other words, a juror’s own implicit or explicit 
stereotypes may affect his or her determination of normative reasonableness. 
To help reduce this possibility, we adopt Lee’s suggestion of giving jurors a 
race-switching instruction.194 The instruction would tell jurors: 
Race-switching involves imagining the same events, the same 
circumstances, the same people, but switching the races of the 
parties. . . . If your evaluation of the case before you is different 
after engaging in race-switching, this suggests a subconscious 
reliance on stereotypes. You may then wish to reevaluate the case 
from a neutral, unbiased perspective.195 
This supplemental jury instruction would reinforce to jurors that reliance on 
stereotypes when determining whether the defendant’s mistaken belief was 
normatively reasonable is inappropriate. It might also provide an effective 
means for jurors to evaluate whether their own decisions were influenced by 
racial stereotypes, either conscious or not. The race-switching instruction 
should be given whenever a party requests it or the judge determines that it 
is appropriate.196 If the jury finds that the actor’s mistake was unreasonable, 
then it can find the actor guilty of manslaughter instead of murder under 
the doctrine of imperfect self-defense. 
III. THE DUTY TO RETREAT 
The suspicion heuristic reveals that the right to act in self-defense can 
place those stereotyped as criminal at greater risk of death or serious bodily 
injury at the hands of those who honestly, but mistakenly, fear them. In the 
Subparts that follow, we consider whether the law of self-defense can help 
insulate against these tragic outcomes by imposing a duty to retreat. First, we 
 
 192. Lee, supra note 3, at 479. 
 193. Some might bristle at the idea of judges giving instructions such as this one. Some 
might even argue that it is inappropriate. However, U.S. District Court Judge for the Northern 
District of Iowa Mark Bennett already gives jurors supplemental instructions that address the 
effects of racial stereotypes on judgments. Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of 
Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, 
and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 169 (2010).  
 194. Lee, supra note 3, at 481–82.  
 195. Id. at 482. 
 196. Id. at 468. 
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discuss the history of the duty to retreat from the English common law to the 
modern “Stand Your Ground” laws. Then, we suggest that the trend in most 
American jurisdictions to abandon the retreat requirement pays insufficient 
attention to the role of mistake. Finally, we argue that the duty to retreat 
should be a requirement of all self-defense laws.197 
A. HISTORY 
1. English Common Law 
The English common law required a person attacked in a public place 
to make every attempt to retreat to a place of safety before using deadly 
force to protect himself. The reason for this was that killings done solely to 
protect oneself (se defendendo killings) were considered excusable, not 
justifiable.198 Thus, if the actor failed to retreat when he could have before 
using deadly force, he would be convicted of murder. Justifiable homicides, 
on the other hand, did not impose a duty to retreat.199 However, these 
homicides were limited to those executed in furtherance of the law,200 such 
as killing a felon who had escaped capture, committed a capital crime, or 
already been sentenced to death.201 
Distinguishing between justifiable and excusable homicides at common 
law could become complicated when a person was defending himself against 
an attack by a felon. In these cases, only if the felon was engaged in a capital 
crime against the actor was the killing considered justifiable.202 Surprisingly, 
however, only the killing of would-be robbers was justifiable.203 All other 
homicides, including those in which the actor was defending himself against 
an attempted murderer who did not intend to rob him, were classified as se 
 
 197. We do not consider whether the duty should extend to one’s home because no 
jurisdiction requires this.  
 198. Garrett Epps, Any Which Way but Loose: Interpretive Strategies and Attitudes Toward Violence 
in the Evolution of the Anglo-American “Retreat Rule,” 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 303, 307–08 
(1992). A se defendendo killing was one where “a man may protect himself from an assault or the 
like, in the course of a sudden broil or quarrel, by killing him who assaults him.” Id. at 308–09 
(quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *184). 
 199. See id. at 309. 
 200. Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L. REV. 567, 568 (1903). 
Or, as Blackstone put it, for a homicide to be justifiable “the law must require [the killing].” 
Epps, supra note 198, at 308 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 198, at *178) (alteration in Epps).  
 201. Epps, supra note 198, at 307–08; see also Beale, supra note 200, at 568.  
 202. Epps, supra note 198, at 309; Singer, supra note 179, at 471–72.  
“[I]ndeed, because he or she was carrying out a public duty by preventing a felony, 
one could almost argue . . . that the slayer had a duty not to retreat. Rather than 
seeking to excuse the slayer’s behavior—as with the slayer se defendendo—the slayer 
in a ‘felony prevention’ situation was attempting to justify his or her act, claiming 
that he or she was right in so acting.”  
Id. at 472. 
 203. Beale, supra note 200, at 572 (providing explanatory sources).  
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defendendo homicides, requiring the actor to retreat before using deadly 
force.204 
2. United States Doctrine 
Across the ocean, the law developed differently.205 Some American 
jurisdictions followed the common law approach, imposing a duty to retreat 
in se defendendo homicides.206 The majority of jurisdictions, however, 
departed from the English common law rule.207 In these jurisdictions, no 
retreat was required as long as the individual was “without fault” and “in a 
place where he has a right to be.”208 
For instance, in Erwin v. Ohio, the defendant and his son-in-law were 
involved in a dispute concerning the right to use a shed that was not in the 
curtilage of either’s property.209 Days before the homicide, the son-in-law 
removed all the defendant’s tools from the shed and put a new lock on the 
door.210 On the day of the homicide, the defendant had removed the locks 
and was storing his tools in the shed when the two argued. The son-in-law 
approached the shed with an axe on his shoulders and the defendant 
warned him not to enter.211 When the victim got to the door, the defendant 
shot him dead.212 
At trial, the court instructed the jury on the duty to retreat over the 
defendant’s objection.213 On appeal, the court held that when a defendant is 
not at fault, there is no duty to retreat, writing: 
The question, then, is simply this: Does the law hold a man who is 
violently and feloniously assaulted responsible for having brought 
such necessity upon himself, on the sole ground that he failed to fly 
from his assailant when he might have safely done so? The law, out 
of tenderness for human life and the frailties of human nature, will 
not permit the taking of it to repel a mere trespass, or even to save 
life, where the assault is provoked; but a true man, who is without 
fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant, who, by violence or 
surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or do him enormous 
bodily harm.214 
 
 204. See id. at 572–73. 
 205. For a general history of the duty to retreat in the U.S., see RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, 
NO DUTY TO RETREAT: VIOLENCE AND VALUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY (1991). 
 206. See, e.g., Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150, 175–77 (1860). 
 207. See DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 123, at 229. 
 208. Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 84 (1877). 
 209. Id. at 192. 
 210. Id. at 192–93. 
 211. Id. at 193. 
 212. Id.  
 213. Id. at 193–94. 
 214. Id. at 199–200. 
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The Erwin court decided that this rule was “the surest to prevent the 
occurrence of occasions for taking life; and this, by letting the would-be 
robber, murderer, ravisher, and such like, know that their lives are, in a 
measure, in the hands of their intended victims.”215 
Other courts that rejected a duty to retreat in the same time period 
reasoned similarly. For instance, the Indiana Supreme Court wrote: 
The tendency of the American mind seems to be very strongly 
against the enforcement of any rule which requires a person to flee 
when assailed, to avoid chastisement or even to save human life, 
and that tendency is well illustrated by the recent decisions of our 
courts, bearing on the general subject of the right of self-defence. 
The weight of modern authority, in our judgment, establishes the 
doctrine, that, when a person, being without fault and in a place 
where he has a right to be, is violently assaulted, he may, without 
retreating, repel force by force, and if, in the reasonable exercise of 
his right of self-defence, his assailant is killed, he is justifiable.216 
In a line of cases replete with inconsistencies and confusion,217 
culminating in Brown v. United States,218 the Supreme Court held that there 
was no duty to retreat. Brown involved a fight between employees at the site 
of a new post office that resulted in death. At trial, the court instructed the 
jury on the duty to retreat.219 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, 
with Justice Holmes writing in a now famous passage: 
Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an 
uplifted knife. Therefore in this Court, at least, it is not a condition 
of immunity that one in that situation should pause to consider 
whether a reasonable man might not think it possible to fly with 
safety or to disable his assailant rather than to kill him.220 
Today, only a minority of jurisdictions recognize a duty to retreat. 
3. Stand Your Ground Laws 
Recently, states have replaced the duty to retreat with “Stand Your 
Ground” laws. Florida was one of the first states to pass such a law, so we will 
consider that statute specifically here.221 However, many states have since 
passed statutes modeled on Florida’s law.222 
 
 215. Id. at 200. 
 216. Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 84 (1877). 
 217. See Epps, supra note 198, at 316–22 (discussing the Court’s “acrobatics”).  
 218. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921). 
 219. Id. at 342. 
 220. Id. at 343 (citing Rowe v. United States, 164 U.S. 546, 558 (1896)). 
 221. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013(3) (West 2010 & Supp. 2012). See generally Anthony J. 
Sebok, Florida’s New “Stand Your Ground” Law: Why It’s More Extreme than Other States’ Self-Defense 
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Prior to its passage in 2005, Florida’s self-defense statute justified the 
use of deadly force only when the actor “reasonably believe[d] that such 
force [was] necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm . . . or 
to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony.”223 The state 
recognized the common-law duty to retreat, which provided that the use of 
deadly force was justified only after the actor “use[d] every reasonable 
means to avoid . . . danger,” unless the actor was in his or her own home.224 
Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law made major changes to existing law. 
Among other things, it eliminated the duty to retreat when the actor was in a 
“place where he or she has a right to be.”225 The intent of the law was “to 
restore [the] absolute rights of law-abiding people to protect themselves . . . 
from intruders and attackers without fear of prosecution or civil action”226 
 
Measures, and How It Got That Way, FINDLAW (May 2, 2005), http://writ.news. 
findlaw.com/sebok/20050502.html. 
 222. Alabama (ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2011)); Arizona (ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-411 (2010 & Supp. 2011–2012)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-23.1 
(West Supp. 2011)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-2 (West 2012)); Kansas (KANS. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-5230 (2011)); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.055(3) (West Supp. 2011)); 
Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20 (2007 & Supp. 2012)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
780.972 (2007)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15 (2006)); Missouri (MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 
563.031(3), 563.074 (West 1999 & Supp. 2012)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3-110 
(Supp. 2009)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.120 (Supp. 2009)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 627:4 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2011)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
51.3 (2011)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.25 (2002 & Supp. 2012)); 
Pennsylvania (18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505 (1998 & Supp. 2012)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 16-11-440 (Supp. 2011)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-4 (2006)); 
Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-611 (2010)); Texas (TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32 
(2011)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402 (2008 & Supp. 2011)); Washington (WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 9A.16.050 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-
22 (LexisNexis 2008)). 
 223. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012.  
 224. State v. James, 867 So. 2d 414, 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).  
 225. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013(3). Section 776.013(3) provides: 
A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in any 
other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the 
right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force 
if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great 
bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a 
forcible felony. 
Id. Today, the majority of American jurisdictions have abandoned the retreat requirement. 
Jason W. Bobo, Following the Trend: Alabama Abandons the Duty To Retreat and Encourages Citizens 
To Stand Their Ground, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 339, 339 (2008); Epps, supra note 198, at 311–14. 
 226. S.B. 436, 107th Leg., 37th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005). As Representative Dennis K. Baxley 
declared, the statute stakes out “a clear position that we will stand with victims of violent attacks 
when the law is in their favor.” Abby Goodnough, Florida Expands Right To Use Deadly Force in Self-
Defense, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/27/national/27shoot.html. 
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and to “abrogate[] the common law duty to retreat when attacked before 
using deadly force.”227 
B. THE ROLE OF MISTAKE 
Neither the English common law nor “Stand Your Ground” laws 
consider the role that mistake should play in the context of the duty to 
retreat.228 Under the English common law, this failure can be attributed to 
the fact that “the primary weapons were knives, swords, poles and the like” 
and not guns.229 Because these weapons required close contact, mistakes 
about the victim’s deadly intent likely were rare.230 
Today, however, the ready availability of guns increases the likelihood 
of mistakes since a person can no longer rely upon close physical proximity 
to deduce the victim’s intent. Yet, in almost every jurisdiction abrogating the 
duty to retreat in the U.S., the rationale centers on the rights of innocent 
people to defend themselves against dangerous individuals.231 There is no 
recognition of the reality of mistaken judgments. Perhaps this absence is 
related to the fact that the ready availability of guns may make retreat 
dangerous. However, the duty to retreat has never required individuals to 
retreat when it is not completely safe to do so. 
Failing to impose a duty to retreat, when it can be accomplished with 
complete safety, privileges the life and autonomy interests of law-abiding 
actors over potential victims. Perhaps this balance is appropriate when one 
imagines the culpable victim who is the initiator of a deadly conflict.232 After 
all, it could be said that these culpable victims assumed the risk of death, or 
perhaps even forfeited their right to life, based upon their wrongful 
conduct.233 The same obviously cannot be said about the law-abiding, but 
stereotyped-as-criminal, victim. Hence, the failure to impose a duty to retreat 
either rests on the faulty premise that individuals do not make mistaken 
judgments, and thus, a duty to retreat is unnecessary, or that it simply does 
not matter that mistaken judgments occur. Both premises are problematic. 
 
 227. FLA. S. JUDICIARY COMM., SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, S. 
19-CS/CS/SB 436, 1st Reg. Sess., at 5 (2005), available at http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/ 
session/2005/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/2005s0436.ju.pdf. 
 228. Singer, supra note 179, at 474 (“[W]riters did not even discuss the effect of mistake in 
either justifiable or excusable self defense . . . .”). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See supra notes 214–27 and accompanying text. 
 232. But see Beale, supra note 200, at 581 (“It is undoubtedly distasteful to retreat; but it is 
ten times more distasteful to kill.”). 
 233. Sanford H. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law, 64 CALIF. L. 
REV. 871, 883 (1976) (“Starting with a general right to life possessed by all human beings, the 
argument is that the aggressor, by his culpable act, forfeits his right to life. This analysis, 
however, is unsatisfactory on a number of counts.”). 
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Given that mistaken judgments occur, and are even more likely when 
the victim fits a criminal stereotype, the choice to privilege the autonomy 
interests of law-abiding actors over law-abiding victims is not an obvious one. 
In order to recognize and potentially protect the liberty and security 
interests of those stereotyped as criminal, as well as other victims of mistaken 
judgments, the law should require a duty to retreat. This is discussed next.  
C. A PROPHYLACTIC MEASURE 
The elimination of the duty to retreat is premised on concern for the 
safety and autonomy interests of law-abiding actors and a failure to 
recognize the heightened risk of mistaken judgments against those innocent 
individuals who are stereotyped as criminal. Imposing a duty to retreat 
would more appropriately balance the interests of both mistaken actors and 
innocent victims. Requiring retreat is especially important because the 
actors include civilians. If the only people entitled to act in self-defense were 
police officers, there might be a stronger argument against imposing a duty 
to retreat because officers could be required to engage in training aimed at 
reducing the effects of the suspicion heuristic on their judgments. However, 
it would be more difficult to require civilians to participate in such trainings, 
even if they were effective.234 Thus, the best way to safeguard against 
mistaken judgments caused by the suspicion heuristic is to impose a duty to 
retreat when it is safe to do so. 
We are not arguing that the duty to retreat would always accomplish the 
goal of saving an innocent life. Citizens would need to learn about the duty 
to retreat before it might influence their behavior. Furthermore, in the heat 
of the moment, individuals may not be aware that a safe avenue of retreat is 
possible. However, there are certainly circumstances where imposing a duty 
to retreat could make the difference between life and death for the innocent 
victim. And without it, there is no mechanism to at least attempt to protect 
stereotyped individuals from the risk of death or serious injury due to 
mistaken judgments. 
The retreat requirement also has the potential to serve a debiasing 
function in suspicion heuristic cases. Retreat would force individuals to take 
a “time out” before acting on their intuitions. Withdrawing to a place of 
safety, if possible, might release some anxiety and give people time to 
engage in more deliberate, conscious, and effortful thinking. The duty 
might allow individuals an opportunity to consider alternatives, rather than 
jumping to conclusions on the basis of limited information. 
 
 234. We could imagine requiring such trainings as a requirement for obtaining a gun 
license. However, without consistent practice, the requirement would be ineffective. See Adam 
Benforado, Quick on the Draw: Implicit Bias and the Second Amendment, 89 OR. L. REV. 1, 57–59 
(2010) (arguing that gun owners be required to engage in mandatory ongoing training). 
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Furthermore, requiring retreat would help to clarify the intent of the 
victim. If, upon retreat, the victim continues to pursue, this decreases the 
likelihood of a mistaken judgment. Thus, the duty to retreat could reduce 
the ambiguity often inherent in cases of self-defense. 
Finally, imposing a duty is also consistent with the classification of 
mistaken self-defense as excusable. An excuse, as discussed above, focuses on 
the moral blameworthiness of the actor. If a defendant knows he can retreat 
safely before using deadly force, but chooses not to, he is no longer morally 
innocent. 
The duty to retreat should be a mandatory requirement of all self-
defense laws. The Model Penal Code (“MPC”)235 and some states236 already 
impose such a duty. Given the national attention the shooting death of 
Martin has received, the time is ripe for change. Already, many prosecutors 
and law enforcement officials oppose “Stand Your Ground” laws237 and some 
states are considering proposals to repeal or amend them.238 
If a duty to retreat becomes a mandatory component of self-defense 
laws, how would it affect the analysis of mistake in suspicion heuristic cases? 
In cases where no safe avenue of retreat exists, no change in analysis is 
necessary. The actor should be partially excused for the reasons discussed 
previously.239 However, what should happen in situations where a safe 
avenue of retreat does exist? The answer depends on whether the actor is 
aware of it. If the actor is unaware that retreat is possible, we would treat this 
situation as analogous to the case where no safe avenue exists. The actor 
should be partially excused.240 But, if the actor is aware of the safe avenue of 
 
 235. The MPC provides that “[t]he use of deadly force is not justifiable . . . if . . . the actor 
knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating.” 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii) (Official Draft 1985). 
 236. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (McKinney 2004). 
 237. Goodnough, supra note 226; Adam Liptak, 15 States Expand Right To Shoot in Self-
Defense, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/07/us/07shoot.html. 
 238. See, e.g., Kate Abbey-Lambertz, Stand Your Ground: Michigan Act Similar to Florida Law 
Used in Trayvon Martin Case Provokes Repeal Effort, HUFFINGTON POST (May 18, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/18/stand-your-ground-michigan-law-florida-trayvon-
martin-self-defense-act_n_1527349.html; Hayes Hunt, “Stand Your Ground” Laws—The Trayvon 
Martin Case & Neighborhood Watch Groups, FROM THE SIDEBAR (Apr. 9, 2012), 
http://practiceview.muzeview.com/links/index.php?id=3670757 (reporting that a group of 
Florida legislators has created a task force to consider whether the Stand Your Ground law 
should be amended or repealed); see also Adam Cohen, The Growing Movement To Repeal “Stand 
Your Ground” Laws, TIME IDEAS (Apr. 16, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/04/16/the-
growing-movement-to-repeal-stand-your-ground-laws. 
 239. See supra Part II.B. 
 240. In jurisdictions that currently recognize the duty to retreat, the defendant must be 
aware that a safe escape exists before the duty applies. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 
121, at 230, 255; see also Redcross v. State, 708 A.2d 1154, 1158 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998). We 
believe that subjective awareness of the duty to retreat is important because due to the stress of 
the encounter, individuals may not be able to think clearly enough to recognize that a safe 
avenue of escape exists. As Kenneth Simons observes, based on scientific evidence, “[i]n the 
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retreat, then the actor is no longer entitled to an excuse because his or her 
failure to avoid the use of deadly force by retreating makes him or her 
culpable and a murder conviction would be appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Scholars, lawyers, and policymakers should attend to the ways that 
normal psychological processes can bias decisions and outcomes in ways 
inconsistent with the values our society treasures. The stakes to liberty, 
safety, and security are too important to ignore. What is required is a new 
language that can account for these biases—one that does not rely upon the 
fiction of the rational decision-maker or the scapegoat of the consciously 
biased actor. Because the suspicion heuristic invokes implicit biases that are 
collectively created and reinforced, ameliorating it suggests a kind of shared 
responsibility. Put another way, because there is shared responsibility with 
regards to creating implicit biases,241 there is a moral argument to be made 
in favor of a shared responsibility for their consequences. This is consistent 
with the principles of community policing242 and procedural justice,243 now 
championed by much of progressive law enforcement. 
The suspicion heuristic begins to provide a broader language for 
engaging notions of bias in criminal justice without requiring a discussion of 
an individual’s character. If the declining pervasiveness and severity of racial 
bigotry is to be taken seriously,244 then it is exactly this sort of language that 
will become increasingly necessary in order to make sense of persistent 
inequalities. More importantly, the consensus among mind scientists is that 
malicious intent is not a necessary condition of discrimination or inequality. 
Yet, without a language with which to engage contexts in which racial 
 
fast-moving context of a violent attack, it is often unrealistic to expect the person attacked to 
consciously and carefully evaluate the precise extent of a threat, the likely effect of his response 
on the aggressor, and the availability of alternatives.” Kenneth W. Simons, Self-Defense: Reasonable 
Beliefs or Reasonable Self-Control?, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 51, 78 (2008).  
 241. See, e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 40, at 476; Devine, supra note 20, at 5–6; 
Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 1464–65 (supporting existence of implicit 
biases). 
 242. See generally WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING, 
CHICAGO STYLE (1997) (discussing the importance of police departments working with the 
community to solve problems); ROBERT TROJANOWICZ & BONNIE BUCQUEROUX, COMMUNITY 
POLICING: HOW TO GET STARTED (2d ed. 1998) (same). 
 243. See generally TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC 
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 49–57 (2002) (discussing the importance of 
community involvement to effective law enforcement); Jason Sunshine & Tom Tyler, Moral 
Solidarity, Identification with the Community, and the Importance of Procedural Justice: The Police as 
Prototypical Representatives of a Group’s Moral Values, 66 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 153 (2003) 
(demonstrating that people are more likely to work with the police when they believe the police 
share their moral values); Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and 
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513 (2003) (exploring the 
relationship between procedural justice and the public’s views of the police). 
 244. Bobo, supra note 110, at 1196; Goff, Steele & Davies, supra note 67, at 91. 
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inequality is produced and maintained in the absence of racial bigotry, the 
law is severely limited in its ability to apply a remedy to objectionable racial 
discrimination. 
This Essay outlined the psychological mechanisms that frequently result 
in racially biased perceptions and judgments of suspicion, and some 
attendant behaviors that follow these initial perceptions.245 While this 
represents a first step towards a necessary expansion of the legal reasoning 
and doctrine around suspicion, our review was limited to a discrete analysis 
of the perceiver. Psychological processes, however, exist in a much wider 
and more dynamic network of agents and contexts, all of which can 
influence a given perceiver and, more importantly, the outcomes of a given 
encounter. 
For instance, some contexts may provoke non-Whites to behave more 
suspiciously—in actuality—than Whites behave.246 In fact, one’s concern 
with being perceived as criminal may literally cause one to behave more 
anxiously, which can in turn lead to perceptions of “suspicious” behavior. 
These types of situational cues can accumulate, leading to what, in our 
upcoming work, we refer to as suspicion cascades247—the waves of social and 
psychological factors that can literally produce a social reality of suspicion 
where one did not exist before. And, of course, these waves tend to crash 
harder on stigmatized group members than on dominant ones. 
Similarly, beyond the domain of self-defense concerns regarding racial 
bias in criminal suspicion, there are a host of legal domains in which 
pervasive and unintentional psychological biases could play a key role. Given 
the fundamental role that human psychological processes play in 
perceptions, emotions, and behaviors, it must follow that the biases 
influencing suspicion would also affect policing decisions, employment 
decisions, decisions about allocating political goods (e.g., voting rights), and 
jury deliberations. Consequently, legal scholars should understand the ways 
in which these nearly universal “traps of the mind” influence our ability 
to treat individuals from different groups fairly. The need for a broader 
language to address these “traps” therefore becomes clear. 
In sum, fixating on whether or not individuals harbor bigoted beliefs 
can make it difficult to see the larger context in which the socio-political 
 
 245. This Essay used the lens of behavioral realism, an approach to the law that calls upon 
courts and legislature to base legal rules on the best available evidence that exists on how 
people behave rather than on common sense assumptions. See generally Symposium on Behavioral 
Realism, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945 (2006). 
 246. Cynthia J. Najdowski & Phillip A. Goff, Presentation at the Fourth Int’l Cong. on 
Psychol. & Law, Stereotype Threat in Police Encounters: Why Innocent African Americans Are 
at Risk of Being Targeted as Suspects (Mar. 4, 2011). 
 247. See Phillip Atiba Goff & L. Song Richardson, No Bigots Required: What the Science of Racial 
Bias Reveals in the Wake of Travyon Martin, in PURSUING TRAYVON MARTIN: HISTORICAL CONTEXTS 
AND CONTEMPORARY MANIFESTATIONS OF RACIAL DYNAMICS (George Yancy & Janine Jones eds.) 
(forthcoming fall 2012) (discussing suspicion cascades).  
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construction of race shapes our very perceptions and behaviors that operate 
beneath conscious awareness.248 Though overt racism continues to plague 
American hearts and minds, the path towards racial justice requires a 
broader lens than one that telescopes conscious intentions to the exclusion 
of other factors. Those who have lost their lives in the shadow of racially 
suspect behaviors deserve better than a legacy of distraction and inquisitions 
about character. In other words, in addition to combating the individual 
overt bigotry that inhabits our hearts and minds, it is time for us to take 
equally seriously the shared unconscious biases that lurk beneath the 
surface. Because, if we are concerned with the targets of racism—and not 
just racist actors—then we must acknowledge that bigotry is not a necessary 
condition for the reproduction of racial disparities of all types. 
 
 248. See Thomas C. Holt, Marking: Race, Race-Making, and the Writing of History, 100 AM. 
HIST. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (noting that “‘race’ inheres neither in biology nor in culture but must be 
summoned to consciousness by their encounters in social space and historical time”). 
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